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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WAYNE S. TIPPETT,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

FRED VANDERVEUR,

)

Appellant,

Appellee.

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF
OF APPELLANT
Case # 990178-CA

)

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT A

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WAYNE S TEPPETT,

RULING

Petitioner,
Case No 970800314 RN

vs.
FRED VANDERVEUR,

Judge John R. Anderson
Respondent.

The Court has carefully read the memoranda regarding Tippett's Petition for PostConviction Relief.
The petition is denied for the reasons set forth in the Respondent's memorandum.
DATED this

day of February, 1999

Judge John R. Anderson
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I do hereby certify that on this / day of February, 1999,1 hand-delivered or mailed,
postage prepaid, the foregoing Ruling to the following Angela F Micidos, Assistant Attorney
General, P 0 Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, Joann Stringham, Uintah County
Attorney, 152 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, and to Julie McPherson, Attorney for the
Petitioner, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Deputy Court Clerk
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Appellee.

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT B

1

done.

If I am going to make a trip to Gunnison, I am

effectively going to wipe out one full day of work
regardless.

Four hours there, four hours back.

Visit

^ng-^ywjier^

—

•

—

-

—

•

>

remember particularly how long these were.

But it was

7
easy to say, okay.

If I am going to wipe out the

8
whole day at work, I am going to go to Gunnison, then
9
I can keep on going, spend the night and talk to
.0
11
12

relatives. My in-laws live m Fillmore, whicn is
another 80, 90 miles past Gunnison.
Q

And do you believe you could have raised any

13

other issue more effectively, or a little more

14

effectively helped him on petition for rehearing if

15

you had gone out and visited him with a copy of the

16

appellate decision in hand versus instructing his

17

secretary to mail it to him?

18

A

I'm not sure that it would have made any

19

difference on my effectiveness on petition for

20

rehearing.

21

opinion.

22

That it was not clear to me based on law whether my

23

representation went that far, to please advise me what

24

he wanted to do.

25

Q

Again, as I said, I sent him a copy of the

Told him that we could be doing certificate.

Were you ever advised prior to the appellate
93

IM Mil IM \HCOURI 1)1 \PPI \l b

WAYNE S. TIPPETT,

v.

)
)
I
)
)

I Kl h i \NI>I l'\ I MfJ

)

Appell ml

Appellee.

ADDENDUM 10 BRIEF
OFAPPEILANT
I ase// W0I7S CA

)

\DDhNDUM EXHIBIT C

office.

Probably six or seven times. And then I

talked to him about three times, three or four times
on the phone.
Q

When he would call during the six or seven

times when you were not available to talk to him, were
his calls accepted by your secretary?
A

Probably not.

Q

Did you ever send Mr. Tippett letters

explaining to him why you felt some of his issues were
frivolous or not timely or not right for review based
on current case law?
A

I never told him any of his issues were

frivolous.
Q

Did you ever tell him any --

A

I did not explain in the letters to him those

things because I had explained them to him in the
visits that where I considered they were proper in the
context of what we were dealing with at that time.
Q

And when did you send Mr. Tippett a copy of

your brief-fcLlgd in Utah Supreme Courti
A

I did not personally do it.

I directed my

secretary to do it within the week, within a week or
so after it was filed.
Q

Did you ever tell Mr. Tippett that you would

send him a copy of the draft of the brief for his
79
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

*
*
*
*
*

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Case No.

94-0369

it

*

WAYNE S. TIPPETT,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-2-3 (i).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea?
The court should review this case using an

,f

abuse of

discretion" standard, State vs. Mildenhall. 747 P.2d
422, (Utah 1987) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case is governed in part by Rule 11(e), Utah Rujes of
Criminal Procedure, which was at the time of the plea codified as
Title 77, Chapter, 35, Section 11(e), Utah Code Annotated.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's denial of
Motion

to

Withdraw

Guilty

Plea

submitted

appellant on the 9th of June, 1994.

by

the

a

defendant/

The motion was denied by two

separate rulings; one dated June 29, 1994 and a supplementary ruling dated July 12, 1994.
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Eighth District
Court for Uintah County, State of Utah on the 18th of February,
1986 with two counts of Aggravated Kidnapping in violation of
Section 76-5-302 Utah Code Annotated.
Firearms Enhancement
Code.

Each count also provided a

Provision pursuant

to Section 76-3-23 Utah

On February 26, 1986 the Defendant/Appellant plead guilty

to Count One of the Information.
dismissed.

Count Two of the Information was

The record does not reveal that any affidavit was used

to assist the court in an explanation of Defendant/appellant's Rule
11(e) rights

at the time of plea.

After a colloquy with the

Honorable Richard Davidson, the court accepted the guilty plea.
The matter came before the court for sentencing on the 26th day of
March,

1986,

the

Honorable

Boyd

Bunnell

presiding..

, The

defendant/appellant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory sentence
at

the Utah

enhancement

State

Prison

of

15 years

requiring an additional

to life with a firearm

5 to 10 years to be served

consecutively with the 15 years to life sentence.

On May 20, 1987

at the request of the Chairman of the Board of Pardons, the court

2

reviewed

the Defendant/appe.Unt•.

Honorable

Dennis

originally imposed.

Draney

sentence.

presiding,

T h e court,

re-affirmed

On June ,. 1 9 M , D e £ e n d a n t

th.

the sentence

H U d

,M o t i o n

t

o
All th
e
prior judges having retired, resigned, or being deceased, the case

Withdraw Guilty Plea before the Eighth District Court.

was re-assigned to the Honorable John Anderson.

Judge Anderson

issued a s u g a r y ruling with no response from the State of Otah on
June 29, 1994 denying al! aspects of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw
ouilty plea excepting for a response by the state the issue of
inadequate explanation of the firearms enhancement.

an

After

considering the state's response, on July !2, !994 Judge Anders

on
- s u e d a ruling denying the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea in its entirety stating that the eou.t had substantially
complied with the requirements of Rule 11(e).
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
is in error.

The court made no findings thar the appellant waived

•us right to self incrimination.

The court made no findings that

the appellant understood the nature and elements of the crime and
that

his plea

admitted

each »«,* each and every element.
The court
incorrectly advised the defendant- a c •« f u
renclant a s t 0
^ e maximum sentence which
could be imposed.
ARGUMENT
BY D m i N G

1
^ ^ O ^ D R A W ' G S SP " ECMSE
™
I T FAPPELLANT'S
COMPLY WITH RULE IHe) olllr ^M
* " E D TO
" ' l - t e ) OP THE RULES OP CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
* u l e U ( e > of t h e Utah R u l e s of Criminal Procedure i n e f f e c t

at the time appellant made his guilty plea as codified in 77-3511(e) provided as follows:
The court . . . shall not accept a (plea of guilty)
until the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2)

That the plea is voluntarily made:

(3)
That the defendant knows he has rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all
of those rights:
(4)
That the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the pi a;
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving ecah of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements.
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what
agreement has been reached.
The record of the entry of pleas is very limited.

From the

record, it appears that no plea affidavit was used, therefore the
court can only determined the trial court's compliance with rule
11 (e) based on the oral representations made m

open court.

That record is bereft of any discussion with the appellant on
several

critical

discussion

points

whatsoever

included

with

the

in

the

appellant

rule.

There

concerning

his

is no
right

against compulsory self incrimination as required by subsection (3)

4

of the rule.

There is no discussion of the nature and elements of

the offense of aggravated kidnapping with a firearms enhancement
as required by Subsection 4 of the rule.

There is no discussion

or record that the guilty pleas was an admission to each of the
elements of the alleged crime as recuired by subsection 4

(Record,

PP 4-7).
The record also reveals that the trial judge affirmative misrepresentated to the appellant the maximum sentence possible as a
result of the plea.

Subsection 5 of the rule required a finding

that

understands

the

defendant

possible sentence.

both

the

minimum

and

maximum

At line 12, page 7 of the record, the trial

judge informed the appellant that a one to five year enhancement
was possible in addition to the five years to life he originally
explained.

No correction of that error was made.

The appellant

was sentenced to a five to ten year firearm enhancement in direct
contradiction to what had been explained.
The standard of review as previously stated is that of an
abuse of discretion by the court.

The companion cases of Warner

v. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah, 1985) and Brooks v. Morris 709 P.
2d 310, (Utah, 1985), established the standard by which a trial
court

accepts

guilty

pleas.

The Supreme

failure of to advise a defendant

Court

stated, that a

of his right concerning self-

incrimination was not alone sufficient to invalidated a guilty plea
provided

that

the

record

as

a whole

showed

requirements were substantially complied with.

that

the rule 11

Subsequently the

Supreme Court in State v. Gibbons. 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah, 1987)
5

replaced

the

"substantial

compliance" standard.
not

rule

with

a

"strict

It has been ruled that the Gibbons rule was

retroactive, however the concepts set forth in Gibbons are

useful.
rely

compliance"

In Gibbons the court stated that the trial court may not

on defense

requirements
affidavit,

counsel

of Rule

or affidavits

11(e).

In his

to satisfy

the specific

case, where there

is nc

the court has a situation much more akin to Gibbons

factually than might typically be the case.
The case most similar to this which has reached the appellate
courts is that of State v. Vasilacopulas, 756 P. 2d 92 (Utah App.
1988).

The Utah Court of Appeals, using the Warner-Brooks test

found that an absence of discussion concerning the possibility of
consecutive sentences, and a failure to find that the defendant
understood

that

possibility

comply with Rule 11(e).

showed

a failure

to substantially

That alone was sufficient to mandate a

reversal of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
withdraw guilty plea.

The court did not consider a failure to

comply with Rule 11(e)(4), citing the failure to comply with the
sentencing portions of the rule as being sufficient.

It can be

presumed that if there had been a problem with an explanation of
the

elements

of

the

offense

as

there

was

in

this

ca?e,, the

Vasilacopulos Court could have only made its decision stronger.
It is also interesting to note that one of the concurring judges
in Vasilacopulos was Richard Davidson, the trial judge who took the
plea in this case.
In this case, we have three major failures to even discuss
6

rights required by the rule.

While the Warner and Brooks cases

state that a failure to explain the right of self incrimination was
not

fatal

in

light

complete than here.

of

the

record,

the record

there was more

Here as well, we have not only a failure to

inform appellant of the maximum sentence, but a misrepresentation
by the court as to the maximum sentence.

When coupled with the

failure to discuss the elements of the offense, the combination is
fatal to the trial court's ruling that the requirements had been
substantially complied with.
discussion of

Finally, even though there was some

some of the Rule 11 requirements at the time the

plea was entered, no findings were made except that the plea was
knowingly made.

(Record, p 8 ) .
CONCLUSION

The record in this case shows affirmative mistakes by the
court in the taking of appellant's plea.
compliance, substantial
required standard.

It does not show strict

compliance, or anything approaching the

Appellant hereby prays that the court reverse

the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea and
remand the case for further proceedings.
Dated this

2^

day of

^ Q U. ufrvA/

1995.

Alan M. Williams
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 940369

v.
WAYNE S. TIPPETT,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTTQN AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered
upon a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated kidnapping, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302
(Supp. 1986) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial
court correctly held that defendant's guilty plea was taken in
substantial compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and, hence, properly denied his motion to withdraw his
plea.

The ultimate decision to deny a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992).

The underlying

findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, State v, stilling,
856 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1993), while the determination of
substantial compliance is a (question of law reviewed for

correctness.

,gee Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah

1992); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented or.
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief.
STATEMENT OF TOE CASE
Defendant was charged on February 18, 1986, with two
counts of aggravated robbery, both first degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1986) (R. 2-3).
Addendum A.

Each charge included a firearm enhancement pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1986) (id.).

Defendant

waived his preliminary hearing on February 25, 1986, and was
bound over to district court (R. 16-17) . At the arraignment or.
February 26, defendant entered a plea of guilty to count one
pursuant to plea discussions with the State, and the second count
was dismissed (R. 18; Arraignment Transcript [hereinafter "Tr."]
34-36, 41) . The court conducted a colloquy with defendant and
accepted the plea (Tr. 36-41).

Following preparation of a

presentence report, the court sentenced defendant to the Utah
State Prison to serve a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years
to life, with a consecutive term of five-to-ten years for the
firearm enhancement (R. 19-21; Sentencing Transcript [hereinafter
"Sent. Tr."] 51-53). x

Addendum B.

On May 20, 1987--fourteen months after defendant was
sentenced--the trial court held a hearing to review defendant's
sentence after receiving a formal request from the Board of Pardons
2

On June 30, 1994, more than eight years after being
sentenced, defendant filed a E£o ^

motion to withdraw his guilt\

plea (R. 72-114) . in response, the trial court sought a written
response from the State regarding the question of the sentencing
court's imposition of a different firearm enhancement penalty
than was explained to defendant when he entered his plea (R. 11516).

The court denied the remainder of defendant's motion (id.).

On July 12, 1994, the court entered a supplemental ruling denying
defendant's motion as it related to the sentence enhancement (R.
121-22).2

Defendant appeals from these two rulings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of

aggravated kidnapping, with a firearms enhancement for each
count, based on his actions of February 17, 1986 (R. 2-3). On
Highway 40 outside Vernal, Utah, defendant used a revolver and
threats of death to force two teenagers to drive him to Rangely,
Colorado (R. 4-7). Defendant released the boys when they arrived
in Rangely and was arrested shortly thereafter by the Rangely
City Police (R. 7).
(R. 31) . The Board was concerned that the sentence was not in line
with those sentences received by similar offenders for similar
crimes, and that defendant "may be able to demonstrate release
readiness at some time sooner than fifteen years from his
commitment" (R. 22-24, 26-28).
The trial court reviewed
unspecified information provided at the hearing and affirmed the
sentence originally imposed upon defendant (R. 31) . This review is
not challenged on appeal.
2

Defendant filed additional motions in the trial court and in
this Court, none of which bear on the issue raised in this appeal
(R. 123-26, 127-29, 130-31, 134-37, 140-42, 143, 154-56, 157-59,
160-61, 162-67).

3

Defendant appeared with counsel before the circuit
court on February 25, 1986, and, after being advised of his
rights by the court, stated that he understood his rights and
waived the preliminary hearing (R. 16-17) . The court bound him
over to the district court for trial (id.).

He appeared for

arraignment before the district court the next morning and pled
guilty to one count of aggravated kidnapping with the use of a
firearm (R. 18; Tr. 34-35, 41),

In return, the State agreed to

seek dismissal of the second count of aggravated kidnapping and
to recommend to the court that "in the event [defendant] is
transferred to another penitentiary that he be given credit for
time served in that other penitentiary against his Utah sentence"
(Tr. 35-36). 3
The judge then questioned defendant concerning the plea
(a copy of the colloquy is attached as Addendum C) . He first
established defendant's name, distinguishing it from numerous
aliases, then ascertained that defendant was not suffering from
the effects of alcohol or drugs (Tr. 36-37).

Defendant admitted

taking methodome while in Salt Lake, but said he was neither
taking it nor under its influence as of the hearing (Tr. 37) .
The court then established that defendant understood why he was
before the court, that a plea was to be entered, that defendant

3

At the time the plea was entered, the record only indicates
that charges "may be pending" in the federal courts, in Salt Lake
County, or in South Carolina (R. 18; Tr. 35).
Only upon
preparation of the presentence report for sentencing was the extent
of defendant's criminal history revealed. See Point IB, footnote
4 and accompanying text, infra.

4

was prepared to proceed, and that defendant had received a copy
of the information and waived its reading (id.) . The judge
explained the first count to defendant and asked whether
defendant was ready to enter a plea andr if so, what it would be
(Tr. 37-38) . Defendant responded that he was aware of the charge
and was prepared to plead guilty (Tr. 38).
The court then asked defendant if he understood that he
was giving up his right to a jury trial, to have his appointed
counsel represent him at trial, to have the State prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and to be
convicted by a unanimous jury (Tr. 38-39).

Defendant

acknowledged his understanding of each of these rights (id.).
The judge also explained defendant's right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses at trial, to present his own
witnesses and his defense, and to appeal any conviction he might
receive, and asked whether defendant understood that his guilty
plea would waive these rights (Tr. 3 9).

Defendant acknowledged

his understanding of each of these points (id.).
The court verified that defendant's plea had not been
obtained through promises or threats, amd that the plea was
entered of defendant's "own free will and choice" (Tr. 39-40).
The judge explained the sentence for the first degree felony,
emphasizing the fact that the court had full discretion in
determining the sentence and was not bound by any representations
anyone else might make (Tr* 40-41)•

The court also explained

that the firearm enhancement carried a penalty "of not less than

5

one or up to five years" on top of the sentence for the felony
(Tr. 40) . Finally, defendant acknowledged that he was entering
the plea because he was "in fact guilty of the crime of
aggravated kidnapping" (Tr, 41). Defendant then entered a guilty
plea, which the court found was knowingly and voluntarily made
(R. 18; Tr. 41).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In advising defendant that his guilty plea subjected
him to a sentence enhancement of one-to-five years, the
sentencing court acted in conformance with the information
available to it at the time it took the guilty plea.

Imposition

at sentencing of a five-to-ten year enhancement was mandated by
statute once the presentence report revealed defendant's prior
convictions involving the use of firearms.

Where only defendant

knew of the previous convictions at the time the plea was entered
and he failed to voice concern over the enhancement either at
sentencing or a year later when his sentence was reviewed and
affirmed, this Court should decline to grant withdrawal of the
guilty plea eight years after its entry.
Defendant's failure to provide sufficient specificity
for his claim that the trial court failed to inform him of the
nature and elements of aggravated kidnapping should defeat his
claim.

Regardless of the ambiguity in defendant's argument, the

record as a whole demonstrates that defendant was adequately
appraised of the nature and elements of the offense through his

6

multiple exposures to the information and his colloquy with the
court.
This Court should not reach defendant's assertion of
insufficient findings because he provides neither legal authority
nor analysis.

Even on its merits, the claim does not warrant

withdrawal of the pre-Gibbona p i e a because specific findings on
all the requirements under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, are not required where the lower court substantially
complied with rule 11, and the court's finding that the plea was
both knowing and voluntary is supported by the record.
Defendant's claims that the trial court failed to
inform him of his right against compulsory self-incrimination and
that the guilty plea constituted an admission to each element of
the offense are not properly before this Court as they are raised
for the first time on appeal and defendant argues neither plain
error nor exceptional circumstances.

Accordingly, this Court

should decline to address these issues.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA WAS APPROPRIATE WHERE THE PRE-GIBBONS PLEA WAS
TAKEN IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11, UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
2L. Introduction
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the judge who took
the plea did not comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Br. of App. at 3-7. He contends that the plea was

not voluntarily and knowingly entered because the judge
misrepresented the maximum sentence available for the firearms
enhancement, did not explain the nature and elements of the
offense under rule 11(e) (4), did not make sufficient findings
under rule 11(e), did not mention defendant's right against
compulsory self-incrimination under rule 11(e)(3), and did not
explain that the plea constituted an admission to each element of
the charged offense under rule 11(e) (4) . I£^ at 4-5•
The colloquy in this case and the absence of a written
plea affidavit fall short of present-day standards for entry of a
guilty plea.

However, this plea was entered prior to this

Court's decision in State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-14
(Utah 1987), which held that strict compliance with
constitutional and procedural requirements during the plea
colloquy was required before a plea could be entered.

Gibbons

constituted a clear break with previous law and was not given
retroactive effect.

State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah
8

1991).

Instead, pleas taken prior to Gibbons are upheld so long

as the record as a whole demonstrates "substantial compliance"
with rule 11 requirements.

Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 8S81

(Utah 1992); ppff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991)-

This plea

was taken in accordance with the standards in place prior to
(gibfrons, and the entire record must be reviewed with that in
mind.
The district court denied defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea below, stating that the sentencing judge had
"complied with Rule 11 so as to apprise Defendant of his
Constitutional rights and of the consequences of entering his
guilty plea" (R. 115) . Addendum D.

In a supplemental ruling on

the firearm enhancement issue, the district court held that "the
general requirements of Rule 11 were met by the arraignment Judge
in this case" and that "the Firearm Enhancement sentence that was
imposed was in compliance with both the Information filed in the
case and with the information given to the Defendant at the
arraignment hearing, given the fact that it was only in the
Defendant's mind and knowledge that there were multiple prior
firearm convictions" (R. 121). Addendum D.
BJ.

The Trial Court Advised Defendant Of The Appropriate
Sentence Given The Available Information: Mandatory
Imposition Of A Greater Enhancement At Sentencing Based On
New Information Previously Known Only Bv Defendant Does Not
Warrant Withdrawal Of The Guilty Plea
Defendant entered his guilty plea nine days following

commission of the offense, and one day following his waiver of a
preliminary hearing and his plea discussion with the State (R. 29

3, 16-18; Tr. 34, 36). No information concerning his criminal
history was provided to the court at the time he entered his plea
(R. 119) . During the plea colloquy, the court explained the
possible sentence for the first degree felony to which defendant
intended to plead guilty (Tr. 40) . Addendum C.

It then

explained that the offense "also carries with it a firearm
enhancement penalty of not less than one or up to five years on
top of that" (i&J • This explanation of the enhancement penalty
conforms with the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp.
1986), which provides that when a person is convicted of a first
degree felony involving a firearm, the court may impose an
additional consecutive sentence of at least one year and may
impose a consecutive indeterminate sentence not exceeding five
years.4
4

Section 76-3-203 provides:

A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree,
for a term at not less than five years, unless otherwise
specifically provided by law, and which may be for life
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile
or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently;

(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm was used or
involved in the accomplishment of the felony and is

10

The court ordered preparation of a presentence report
which revealed that defendant previously had been convicted of ac
least five robberies involving the use of firearms (Sent. Tr. 4849). 5

Under these circumstances, the enhancement statute

mandated imposition of a consecutive sentence of five-to-ten
years "because the defendant has previously been convicted of a
felony where a firearm was used in the crime" (R. 19) . Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203(4} (Supp. 1986) (reproduced in footnote 4 at
pages 10-11).
Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to
inform him of the possible heightened enhancement violated rule
11.

Br. of App. at 5-7.

While the record is clear that the

possibility of a five-to-ten year enhancement was not discussed
at the plea hearing, that fact does not warrant withdrawal of the
guilty plea in this case.
Defendant argues only that the trial court did not
inform him at the plea hearing that the increased enhancement was
possible, not that he was surprised by its imposition at
convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in
addition to any other sentence imposed, be sentenced for
an indeterminate term to be not less than five nor more
than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(Emphasis added.)
The presentence report, which defense counsel acknowledged
below was "fairly accurate" and consistent with what defendant had
told him, showed "a very aggravated criminal history," includino
convictions for five armed robberies in which firearms were used?
escape from a penitentiary with the use of a firearm, and at least
four armed robbery counts pending in other jurisdictions, all
involving the use of firearms (Sent. Tr. 48-49).

11

sentencing.

Br. of App. at 5.

However, neither the court nor

the prosecutor had reason to believe at the time of the plea
hearing that section 76-3-203(4) had any application to this
case; only defendant was privy to the information at that point.
Based on the information available to it, the court disclosed the
sentencing information it reasonably believed to be relevant to
the proceedings.

A review of the subsequent sentencing

proceedings gives rise to the reasonable inference that at
sentencing, everyone understood that the mandatory enhancement
under section 76-3-203(4) would be imposed because of the
information revealed in the presentence report (Tr. 48-51).
Defendant gave no indication that the increased enhancement was
unexpected; his counsel conceded the accuracy of the report and
revealed that he and defendant had discussed the information
prior to preparation of the report (Sent. Tr. 47), and defendant
knew that the aggravated kidnapping charge was subject to the
firearm enhancement statute.

Defendant remained silent when the

increased enhancement was announced, and he continued his silence
even though his sentence was reviewed a year later at the request
of the Board of Pardons.6

Although defendant asserted below his

counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to object to the
enhancement change at sentencing (R. 80-81) , he does not renew
that claim on appeal.
Where it is clear that the lower court acted in
conformance with the information available to it at the time it
* See note 1, supra.
12

took the guilty plea, and that defendant voiced no concern over
the increased enhancement, despite being in a position to do so,
this Court should decline to grant withdrawal of the guilty plea
eight years after its entry.
^

D*M F ? i T l A q A If*?1* TVTnnnBtrates ™** Defendant TTn,Wct-,^
Both The Nature AnH T K , P ]eTnents o f \aarmt*A
KiAr>»^Z
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to fully

apprise him of the nature and elements of aggravated
kidnapping.7

Br. of App. at 5] 7. However, he fails to set

forth any particular deficiency in the court's explanation of the
charge.

His failure to develop his position or to provide

'Aggravated kidnapping is defined as follows:
r ^ ™ 1 - 5 person , commits aggravated kidnaping if the
?!« *~*^tentionally or knowingly, without authority of
w i
ft .!? a an gn ea i n s t8 < ***
H of the victim, by any means and
12es
Jtne
L ^victim
L?
?with
' u Tintent:
' c o s i n e s , detains, or transports
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or
nostage, or to compel a third person to engage in
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in
particular conduct; or
To facilitate the commission, attempted
t (b)
commission, or flight after commission or attempted
commission of a felony; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the
victim or another; or
(d)
To interfere with the performance of any
governmental or political function; or
(e) To commit a sexual offense as described in Part
4 of this chapter.
X ^ S S i ^ i 1 7 6 - 5 - 3 0 5 <Supp. 1986). The information reflected
8ubsection
2-3)
AddeSuifE^396
<1> <a> " <c) for each count (R.
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sufficient specificity in his assertion of error should defeat
his claim.

State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)

(refusing to reach an issue which was inadequately briefed);
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v.
Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992).
Regardless of the ambiguity in defendant's argument,
the record as a whole demonstrates that defendant was adequately
appraised of the nature and elements of the offense before
entering his plea.

He had appeared in court five days prior to

entering his plea and listened to the court read the information
(R. 13, 18). The information reflected the language of the
aggravated kidnapping statute, including the requisite elements
of the crime (R. 2-3) . Addendum E.

Although the information did

not include a detailed account of the underlying facts of the
crime, it apprised defendant that the offense involved two
victims whom he allegedly kidnapped at the same time in Uintah
County (id.) .8
Defendant appeared in court again the day before
entering his plea (R. 16-18).

The minute entry of the hearing

reflects that n[t]he Court explained rights to defendant.
Defendant stated he understood his rights [J11 the court granted
the waiver and bound defendant over to the district court (R.
16) . The next day defendant entered his guilty plea (R. 18) .
During the colloquy, after the court established that defendant

1

Defendant raises no challenge on appeal to the adequacy cf
the factual basis for the plea.
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had received a copy 0 f the information, the court paraphrased the
statutory language from the information:

-You understand, Mr.

Tippett, that you are charged with the crime of aggravated
kidnapping in violation of [section] 76-5-302. That's a first
degree felony, which alleges that you at the time and place
[indicated] did take control of people and cause them to be
transported against their will.

You held them under your control

against their will, and that in fact you did utilize a firearm in
the commission of that offense." (Tr. 37-38).

Addendum C.

This

recitation includes the critical elements of the offense and,
when combined with the information, sufficiently defined the
offense so that defendant was apprised of the nature of the
offense to which he was pleading guilty and the critical elements
involved.

££. United Stares v. w ^ a i ,

912

F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th

Cir. 1990) (critical elements, not every element, of pleaded-to
crime should be explained).
In his motion below, defendant argued that the trial
court omitted any reference to the intent requirement of the
offense (R. 77-78).' To the extent his ambiguous argument on
appeal includes this point, the argument is without merit.

^ a ^lndaJt:
? l s o asserted below that, the nature and elements
w h l c h mu st b e
?L* %
??
explained by the court include the fact
v
p ^ L i ^ f
^ ^ 5 n 5 a n " n i e n t statute provides for an increased
! ? ™ " ™ e i ? B ^ U l d . h e . h a v * P r i o r f e l o n y convictions involving
T
dir?,^! ;?•
° t h e ** t e i * h i s ambiguous argument on appeal
M
£*« iS?,* " £ • » « J i o n , the claim is without merit. This Court
£?!.„«.
e * 5 SUCi l enhanc=ement statutes are not part of the
75
?h2f!I:*
iKu V-l n c*TT'
° P ' 2 d 1 8 6 ' 1 9 2 { U t a h 1 9 88). Hence,
luded
•?2L2?
2°**.
within an explanation of the nature and
elements of the crime. £e£ also Point IB, supra.
nf
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ueienaant was appraised of the requisite intent through his
multiple exposures to the information, which echoed the statutory
explanation of intent (R. 13, 18; Tr. 37). Further, while the
court did not specifically identify or define the intent element,
intent could reasonably be inferred from the language used by the
court at the plea hearing.

The court's explanation that

defendant had taken control of people, transported them and held
them against their will by use of a firearm reasonably reflects
the requisite intent for the offense.

Defendant makes no claim

that he was unaware of the intent requirement or that he could
not have reasonably determined the requisite intent element from
the information available to him.

The nature and elements of

this particular offense are clear and readily understandable and
were adequately imparted to defendant prior to entry of his plea
without the need for the exacting particularity he seeks to
impose on the lower court.
D.

The Lack Of Detailed Findings Is Not Critical Where The
Court Specifically Found, And The Record Establishes. That
Defendant Entered His Plea With Full Knowledge And
Understanding Of Its Consequences And The Rights He Was
Waiving
Defendant's brief concludes with a one-line assertion

that "even though there was some discussion of some of the Rule
11 requirements at the time the plea was entered, no findings
were made except that the plea was knowingly made."
at 7.

Br. of App.

This assertion, without legal authority or analysis, is

insufficient to warrant review by this Court.
at 966; Amicone. 689 P.2d at 1344.
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Wareham. 772 P.2d

Even if it is reached, the claim is without merit.
Although the trial court needs to establish the rule 11
information, it need not enter specific findings so long as the
record reflects that the requisite inquiries were made and that
the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.

See State v.

flillqr, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (the absence
of a finding under rule 11 is not critical so long as the record
affirmatively establishes that the plea was entered with full
knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of the rights
being waived) ; ££e also State v. Truiillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d 596,
600-01 (Utah App. 1991) (addressing post-Gibbons plea, absence of
express findings did not warrant withdrawal of plea where the
record established that all rule 11 requirements were addressed
and supported the court's conclusion that the plea was freely and
voluntarily made), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
In this case, the trial court completed the colloquy
and affirmatively found that it was "satisfied that the defendant
has a knowledge of his rights and that this plea is a voluntary
act" (R. 18; Tr. 41). Although the pre-Gibbons exchange did not
strictly follow the litany of rule 11, it substantially complied
with the rule, and the record as a whole supports the court's
ultimate determination of both knowledge and voluntariness.

See

Hoff. 814 P.2d at 1123-24 (requiring only substantial
compliance); Tru-iillo-Marting^. 814 P.2d at 600.
Defendant was apprised of the charges and knew by
virtue of the information that he faced two counts of aggravated
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kidnapping--each involving the use of a firearm--for having
kidnapped two victims.

At the plea hearing, he confirmed his

understanding of the charges, claimed he was fully aware of the
reason for the hearing, denied being under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, and asserted his readiness to enter the plea
despite his knowledge that doing so would waive his
constitutional rights (Tr. 36-38).

Addendum C.

He also admitted

that he was Min fact guilty of the crime of aggravated
kidnapping" (Tr. 41). Addendum C.
Defendant demonstrated no confusion or uncertainty
regarding his rights or the offense he was admitting, but
presented himself as being informed and knowledgeable.

During

the colloquy, he answered the court directly without any
hesitation or evidence of confusion, giving definite, unequivocal
answers and seeking no clarification or explanation concerning
the plea or his rights.

In contrast, he did not hesitate to

voice his uncertainties over his sentencing immediately following
entry of his plea; he freely explained his confusion to the
court, then volunteered to follow his counsel's recommendation
(Tr. 42). Addendum C.
The only requirement not discussed prior to entry of
the plea was the application of the increased enhancement based
on prior felony convictions involving the use of firearms.

As

established above, the fact that this part of the enhancement
statute had any application in this case was unknown to anyone
but defendant prior to preparation of the presentence report.
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Defendant was neither surprised by the enhancement penalty
ultimately imposed nor concerned that his plea had been entered
without full knowledge of the sentence he faced, as evidenced by
his failure to avail himself of the opportunity to address the
point prior to entry of the final judgment or upon review of his
sentence one year later.
That defendant acted voluntarily is also apparent from
the record.

He admitted that no one had induced his plea through

threats or promises (Tr. 39-40), that no one had made any
representations concerning sentencing (Tr. 41), that he was fully
aware that the court had sole responsibility over sentencing
regardless of the parties' recommendations (Tr. 41), and that he
was ready to enter his plea, doing so of his "own free will and
choice" (Tr. 40-41).

Nothing suggests that defendant was or had

reason to be duplicitious or insincere in his responses to the
court.
Because the record reflects substantial compliance with
rule 11 and supports the court's finding that defendant entered
the plea knowingly and voluntarily, the lack of any express
findings on rule 11 factors does not warrant withdrawal of the
plea.
JL.

See Truiillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d at 600-01.

The Claims Involving The Right Against Compulsory Selfincrimination And Admission Of Each Element Of The Offense
Were Not Raised Below And Are Not Properly Before This Court
Although defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his

guilty plea below addressed a number of issues, it did not
include any claim that the trial court failed to discover whether
19

defendant knew of his right against compulsory self-incriminaticr
or that the court failed to explain that his plea would admit
each element of the offense (R. 72-88) . Addendum F.
Accordingly, these two issues are not properly before this Court.
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851# 853-54 (Utah 1992); Gibbons. 740
P.2d at 1311.
Aside from raising the issues for the first time on
appeal, defendant fails to argue either plain error or
exceptional circumstances to justify appellate review of the
issues.

Because he fails to include either argument in his

opening brief, this Court should refuse to consider them.10

See

10

Moreover, neither exceptional circumstances nor plain errc
exists in this case to warrant review of the unpreserved issues
The record reflects no exceptional circumstances warranting a
exception to this Court's general rule.
Further, the law i
existence at the time the plea was entered made it clear that th
court taking a guilty plea^did not have to specifically follow th
litany set forth in rule 11(e) so long as the court found the pis
to be knowing and voluntary and the record, as a whole, establish*
that the plea was entered "with full knowledge and understanding c
its consequences and of the right3 he was waiving[.]" See Warns
v. Morrjs, 709 ?.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 7C
P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). As established in Poir.
ID, supra, this standard was met here. Any oversight by the lowe
court in addressing defendant's right against self-incrimination c
his admission of the elements of the offense would not constitut
plain error where the court was not required to strictly compl
with rule 11(e) and was, as established by the entire recorc
otherwise justified in finding that the plea was, nevertheless
both voluntary and knowing. See Point ID, supra.
Finally, although the court did not expressly say tha
defendant'3 plea effectively admitted each of the elements of t;
offense, defendant freely admitted before entering his plea that ;
was "in fact guilty of the crime of aggravated kidnapping" (?:
41) ,
Hence, express reference to the fact that the pi*
constituted a separate admission to the offense would not affec
the knowing or voluntary nature of the plea. Accordingly, th.
Court should not reach defendant's unpreserved claims.
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state v. Jennings. 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing
to reach an issue raised for the first time on appeal absent an
assertion by defendant of either exceptional circumstances or
plain error); State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 587-88 n.3 (Utah
App.), cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); State v.
Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 & n.5 (Utah App. 1992); fi£.
Brown. 853 P.2d at 854 n.l (refusing to reach a state
constitutional issue not presented in appellant's opening brief);
State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), aff'd,
776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989), varai-prf on other grounds sub nom.
Laffertv v. Cook. 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) ("we will not
engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an argument for
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is
briefed.-).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and
sentence.

•
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 3

day of March, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney/General

^KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT F

Canon 5

SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

(2) shall not practice law in the court on which the judge
serves or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of
that court, or act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which the
judge has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related
thereto.
B. Judges pro tempore. A judge pro tempore shall comply
with Canons 1, 2A, 3B, 3E, and 3F. A judge pro tempore
appointed pursuant to § 78-6-1.5 shall not practice law in the
same small claims division m which the judge serves.
C. Court commissioners. A court commissioner u subject to
this Code to the same extent as a full-time judge.
D. Active senior judges. An active senior judge is not required to comply with Canon 4F.
E. Senior judges. A senior judge is not required to comply
with the provisions of this Code.
CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Preamble A Lawyer's Responsibilities.
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Client-Lawyer Relationship
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1.7. Conflict of interest general rule.
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Meritorious claims and contentions.
Expediting litigation.
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Fairness to opposing party and counsel.
Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal.
Thai publicity.
Lawyer as witness.
Special responsibilities of a prosecutor
Advocate in nonadjudicative proceedings
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Truthfulness in statements to others.
Communication with person represented by counsel.
Dealing with unrepresented person.
Respect for rights of third persons.
Law Firms And Associations

5 1 Responsibilities of a partner or supervisory lawyer.
5 2. Responsibilities of a subordinate lawyer.
5 3 Responsibilities regarding noniawyer assistants.
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Rule
5.4. Professions] independence of a lawyer.
5.5. Unauthorized practice of law.
5.6. Restrictions on right to practice.
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6.1.
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Pro bono publico service.
Accepting appointments.
Membershjp in legal services organization.
Law reform activities affecting client interests.
Information About Legal Services

7.1.
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Communications concerning a lawyer's services
Advertising
Direct contact with prospective clients.
Communication of fields of practice.
Firm names and letterheads.
Maintaining The Integrity Of The Profession
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Bar admission and disciplinary matters.
Judicial officials.
Reporting professional misconduct.
Misconduct.
Jurisdiction.

Preamble: A lawyer's Responsibilities.
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility far
the quality of justice.
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs vanooi
functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an
informed understanding of the client's legal rights and oblig*tions and explains then* practical implications. As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of
the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result
advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of
honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a
lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an
advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each
client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. A
lawyer's representation of a client, including representation
by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the
client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.
In all professional functions, a lawyer should be competent,
prompt and diligent A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation- A lawyer
should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a cheat except so far as disclosure is required or
permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or othei law.
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of
the law, both in professional service to clients and in the
lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use
the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to
harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate
respect for the legal system and for those who serve i*i
including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is
a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of.
official action it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the
law, the administration of justice and the quality of servifl?
rendered by -he legal profession. As a member of a learned
profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law
beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge m reform«*
the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawy«*
should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration «•
justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons'
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who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance and
should therefore devote professional tune and avic influence
in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in
pursuing these objectives and should help the Bar regulate
itself in the public interest.
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as
substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also
guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level
of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to
exemplify the legal profession's ideal of public service.
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually
harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client
and at the same tune assume that justice is being done. So
also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences
ordinarily serves the public interest because people are more
likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal
obligations, when they know their communications will be
private.
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems
arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in
remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory
living The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for
iving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules,
many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although
other professions also have been granted powers of selfgovernment, the legal profession is unique m this respect
because of the close relationship between the profession and
the processes of government and law enforcement This connection is manifested m the fact that ultimate authority over
the legal profession is vested largely m the courts.
lb the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is
obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving
government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more
readily challenged by a profession whose members are not
dependent on government for the right to practice.
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it
special responsibilities of self-government The profession has
a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in
the public interest and not m furtherance of parochial or
self-interested concerns of the Bar Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct A
lawyer should also aid m securing their observance by other
lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the
^dependence of the profession and the public interest which it
serves.
Lawye:
"onal ConductTwhen PororTrlv
, ^* ^ R u i e a 0 ^ ° * * r pe ly apphed
*lationship
° *
' " ™ * define that
3c,ope.

The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They
houid be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal
^presentation and of the law itself. Some of the Rules are
J

imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not" These
define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline.
Others, generally cast m the term "may," are permissive and
define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplinary action should be taken when
the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such
discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships
between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly
obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive m that they define a lawyer's professional role. Many
of the Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add
obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing m
compliance with the Rules.
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the
lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes
relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general Compliance with the Rules, as with all law m an open
society, depends pnmaniy upon understanding and voluntary
compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement
through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however,
exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be
completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a
framework for the ethical practice of law
Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's
authonty and responsibility, principles of substantive law
external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer
relationship exists. Most of the dutiesflowingfromthe clientlawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested
that the lawyer render legal services and the lawyer has
agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of
confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may attach when the
lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship
shall be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship
exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact.
Under vanous legal provisions, including constitutional,
statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government
lawyers may include authonty concerning legal matters that
ordmanly reposes m the client m pnvate client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may
have authonty on behalf of the government to decide upon
settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment.
Such authonty in vanous respects is generally vested m the
attorney general and the state's attorney in state government,
and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of
other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several
government agencies lnintragovernmental legal controversies
in circumstances where a pnvate lawyer could not represent
multiple private clients. They also may have authonty to
represent the "public interest" in circumstances where a
pnvate lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These Rules
do not abrogate any such authonty.
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed
by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The
Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's
conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct m question
and m recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act
upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline
should be imposed for a violation and the seventy of a sanction
depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and
senousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether
there have been previous violations. Disciplinary action shall
be governed by the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State

Rule 1.1

SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

Bar, and the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar to
sustain any allegation of violation by clear and convincing
evidence.
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action,
nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has
been breached. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a
basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules
can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties
as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just K««i« for
a lawyer's self-assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under
the administration of a disciplinary authority does not imply
that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction
has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly,
nothing in the Rule should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern or affect
judicial application of either the client-lawyer or work product
privilege. Those privileges were developed to promote compliance with law and fairness in litigation. In reliance on the
client-lawyer privilege, clients are entitled to expect that
communications within the scope of the privilege will be
protected against compelled disclosure. The client-lawyer
privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer. The fact
that in exceptional situations the lawyer under t i e Rules has
a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not
vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has
a reasonable expectation that information relating to the
client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of
such information may be judicially compelled only in accordance with the recognized exceptions to the client-lawyer and
work product privileges.
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reexamination.
Permitting such reexamination would be incompatible with
the general policy of promoting compliance with law through
assurances that communications will be protected against
disclosure.
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble
and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The
Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the
text of each Rule is authoritative. Research notes were prepared to compare counterparts in the Code of Professional
Responsibility (approved by the Utah Supreme Court February 19, 1971) and to provide selected references to other
authorities. The notes have not been adopted, do not constitute part of the Rules and are not intended to affect the
application or interpretation of the Rules and Comments.
Terminology.
"Belief or "believes" denotes that the person involved
actually supposed the fact in question to be true, A person's
belief may be inferred from circumstances.
"Consult* or "consultation* denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate
the significance of the matter in question.
"Firm" or "lawfirm'*denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private
firm, lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal
services organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10.
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to
deceive and not mereiy negligent misrepresentation or failure
to apprise another of relevant information.
"Knowingly," "known" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge
of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be uaferred
from circumstances.
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"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and a iK.
holder in a law firm organized as a professional coiporitST
•Reasonable" or •reasonably," when used in relat^T^
conduct by a lawyer, denotes the conduct of a n i i ^
prudent and competent lawyer.
—•uaa0jT
•Reasonable belief* or •reasonably believes wnen used *
reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes tk«
matter in question and that the circumstances are such th*t
the belief is reasonable.
•Reasonably should know," when used in reference to
lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence tnd
competence would ascertain the matter in question.
•Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent
denotes a mafcsrial matter of clear amd weighty importance.
CT JENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP
Rule 1.1. Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, jikaQ,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
Rule 1.2. Scope of representation.
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning
the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (b), (c),
(d), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a clientfi
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.
In a criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's decision,
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to wsrive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation
if the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
(d) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance
not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the
relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct
Role 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
Rule 1.4. Communication.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to enable the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
Rule 1.5. Fees.
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or
collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearfr
excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer »
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and fifl»
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Facto**
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l Alawyer
Conflict
transactions.
a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires
the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner
which can be reasonably understood by the client; and
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the
advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the dient unless the
client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the
lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child,
sibling or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including
a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the
donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the
lawyer literary or media rights to. a portrayal or an account
based in substantial part on information relating to the
representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not providefinancialassistance to a client
in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except:
( D A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of
litigation the repayment of which may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter; and
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court
costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
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(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing
a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) The client consents after consultation;
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) Information relating to representation of a client is
protected as required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not
participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of
or against the clients or in a criminal case an aggregated
agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each
client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the
existence and nature of all the Haim« or pleas involved and of
the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively
limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless
permitted by law and the client is independently represented
in making the agreement or settle a claim for such liability
with an unrepresented client or former client without first
advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child,
sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the
client after consultationregardingthe relationship.
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the
cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is
conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee
or expenses; and
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in
a civil case.

(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has inform**^
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to a*
matter.
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be warnd
by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule L7
Rule 1.11. Successive government and private empW
ment.

(a) Except a* law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer
shall not represent a private client in connection with a m»tter
in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially
as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm
with which tttat lawyer is associated may knowingly under*
take or continue representation in such a matter unless:
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screenedfromany partacrpition in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriat*
government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with
the provisions of this Rule.
(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer
having information that the lawyer knows is confidential
government information about a person acquired when the
lawyer was a public officer or employee may not represent i
private client whose interests are adverse to that person in &
matter in which the information could be used to the materiii
disadvantage of that person, unless the appropriate government client consents after consultation with the lawyer A firm
with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified
lawyer is screenedfromany participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.
(c) Excepn as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer
serving as a public officer or employee shall not:
Rule 1.3. Conflict of interest: Former client.
(1) Participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter personally and substantially while in private practice or
shall not thereafter:
nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable liw
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in
factually related matter in which that person's interests are the lawyer's stead in the matter; or
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless
(2) Negotiate for private employment with any person wi»
the former client consents after consultation; or
is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the which the lawyer is participating personally and substandisadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would tially, unless the appropnate government client consents after
permit with respect to a client or when the information has
consultation with the lawyer.
become generally known.
(d) As used in this Rule, the term "matter* includes
(1) Any j udicial or other proceeding, application, request for
Rule 1.10. Imputed disqualification: general rule.
a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other parncaisr
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them matter involving a specific party or parties; and
(2) Any other matter covered by the conflict of interest roles
practicing alone would be prohibitedfromdoing so by Rule 1.7,
of the appropriate government .agency.
1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(e) As used in this Rule, the term "confidential govern©***
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm
may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a information'f means information which has been obtain**
substantially factually related matter in which that lawyer, or under governmental authority and which, at the time th*
a firm with which the lawyer has associated, had previously Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by la^JjDBX
represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to discio*
that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired infor- and which is not otherwise available to the public.
mation protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to
the matter.
Rule 1.12. Former judge or arbitrator.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall a*
firm, thefirmis not prohibitedfromthereafter representing a
person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represent, anyone in connection with a matter in whicn
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a i u °f? §
represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to su«>
in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the person, unless ail parties to the proceeding consent' © ^
disclosure.
client; and
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(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any
person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in
a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other
adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or attorney involved in a matter in which
the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but
only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative
officer or arbitrator.
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in
a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly
undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate
tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a
multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.
Rule 1.13. Organization as a client.

Rule 1-16

holders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule
1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by a person or
entity, other than the individual who is to be represented,
properly authorized by the organization.
(f) A lawyer elected, appointed, retained, or employed to
represent a governmental entity shall be considered for the
purpose of **»* rule as representing an organization. The
government lawyer's client is the governmental entity except
as the representation or duties are otherwise required by law.
The responsibilities of the lawyer in paragraphs (b) and (c)
may be modified by the duties required by law for the
government lawyer.
Rule 1.14. Client under a disability.
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with the representation is impaired,
whether because of minority, mental disability or for some
other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,
Tpnintjiin a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or
t»k* other protective action with respect to a client, only ""hen
the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest.

fa) A lawver employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized Rule 1.15. Safekeeping property.
constituents.
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons
(b) If, in a matter related to the representation of an
organization, a lawyer knows that an officer, employee or that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a represenother person associated with the organization is engaged in, tation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be
intends to engage in, or refuses to take action in violation of a kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the
legal obligation of the organization, or a violation of law that lawyer's office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the
may reasonably be imputed to the organization, and is likely client or third person. The account may only be maintained in
to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer a financial institution which agrees to report to the Office of
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of Disciplinary Counsel in the event any instrument in properly
the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer payable form is presented against an attorney trust account
shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not
and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's the instrument is honored. Other property shall be identified
representation, the responsibility in the organization and the as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of
apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the such account funds and other property shall be kept by the
organization concerning such matters and any other relevant lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to termination of the representation.
minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of reveal(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client
ing information relating to the representation to persons or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify
outside the organization, except as required by law or other the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or
rules of professional conduct. Such measures may include otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a
among others:
lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
funds or other property that the client or third person is
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the orga- person, shall promptly render a fall accounting regarding Buch
nization; and
property.
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organi(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
zation, including, if warranted by the seriousness of tine possession of property in which both the lawyer and another
matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by
of the organization as determined by applicable law.
the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with para- interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective intergraph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of tne ests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the
organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer has "good cause" tto Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation.
resign or withdraw, as appropriate, under Rule 1.16(b)(6).
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers,
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client or, where represenemployees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a tation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representalawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it iis tion of a client if:
apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those
(1) The representation will result in violation of the Rules
of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
of Professional Conduct or other law;
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also repre(2) The lawyer's physical or mental condition materially
sent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, share- impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
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(3) The lawyer is discharged.
(b) A lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if
withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the interests of the client or if:
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving the
lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) The client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a
crime or fraud;
(3) A client insists upon pursuing an objective that the
lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;
(4) The client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to
the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given
reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the
obligation is fulfilled;
(5) The representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably
difficult by the client; or
(6) Other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) This Rule is not violated by a lawyer who continues
representation when ordered to do so by a tribunal, notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
steps to the extent reasonably pracncaDle to protect a client'3
interests, sucn as giving reasonaDle notice to the client,
allowing time tor employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to whicn the client is entitled and
refunding any aavance payment of fee that has not been
earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to
the extent permitted by other law, but must provide, upon
request, the client's file to the client The lawyer may reproduce and retain copies of the client file at the lawyer'a expense.

j ^

lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the Cucaia i
matter that was the subject of the intermediation.
Rule ZZ. Evaluation for use by third per?™(a) A lawyer may undertake an eval
^
affecting a client for the use of someone other than the diem
i£
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes that TT...».., 5 W
^n^
ation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relation,
ship with the client; and
(2) The client consents after consultation.
(b) Except as disclosure is required in connection witk *
report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation
is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
ADVOCATE
Rule 3.1. Meritorious claims and contention]
A lawyer shall not bnng or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless then* is a basis for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer
for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent
in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may never*
theless 30 defend '-he proceeding as to require that every
element of the case oe estaolished.
Rule 3.2. Expe<liting litigation.

COUNSELOR
Rule 2.1. Advisor.
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid aavice. In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law out to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.
Rule 2.2. Intermediary.
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the
implications of the common representation, including the
advantages and risks involved, and the effect of the antorneyclient privileges, and obtains each client's conseat to the
common representation; and
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the mattssr can be
resolved on terms compatible with the client's best interest,
that each client will be able to make adequately informed
decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of ^natenal
prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the? contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
13) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken impartially and witlhout improper effect on other responsibilities the iawyer has- to any of
the clients; and
(4) All requirements of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 are mek.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shaiil consult
with each client concerning the decisions to be made* and the
considerations relevant in making them, so that aasch client
can maKe adequately informed decisions.
»c; A iawyer snail withdraw as intermediary tf amy of the
clients 30 reouests, or if any of the conditions sitated in
paragrapn aj is ao longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the

A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client.
Rule 3.3. Candor toward the tribunal.
(a) A lawyer snail not knowingly:
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law "to a
tribunal;
12) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the ciient;
(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in me
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed br
opposing counsel: or
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, u a
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of iti
falsity, the lawyer 3hail take reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties 3tated in paragraph (a) continue to t b
conclusion of title proceeding, and apply even if complianc*
requires disclosure of information otherwise protected *— 0,,1<
1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer
reasonably believes is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform u»"
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which wul
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether <s
not the facts are adverse.
Rule 3.4. Fairness to opposing party and counsel
A lawyer shall not:
(a) Unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence
or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or °*k^J,
material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer ^ ^
not counsel or assist another person to do any such act; " .
lb) Falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to t e s ^ J
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited
by law;
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(c) Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that
no valid obligation exists;
(d) In pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with
a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;
(e) In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in
issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal
opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a
witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or
innocence of an accused; or
(f) Request a person other than a client to refrain from
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
(1) The person is a relative or an employee or other agent of
a client; and
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving
such information.
Rule 3.5. Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal
A lawyer shall not*
(a) Seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or
other official by means prohibited by law; or
(b) Communicate ex parte with a juror or prospective juror
before the discharge of the jury except as permitted by law; or
ic) In an adversary proceeding, communicate, or cause
another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a
judge or other official before whom a matter is pending, except:
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause;
(2) In writing if the lawyer promptly delivers a copy of the
writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if such
party is not represented by a lawyer;
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to
the adverse party if such party is not represented by a lawyer;
or
(4) As otherwise authorized by law; or
(d) Engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
Rule 3.6. Trial publicity.
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that
a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the
matter.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) a lawyer may state:
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when
prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(2) information contained m a public record;
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and
information necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person
involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the
likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public
interest; and
(7) in a criminal case, m addition to subparagraphs (1)
through (6):
d) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of
the accused;
(u) if the accused has not been apprehended, information
necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(in) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
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(hr) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or
agencies and the length of the investigation.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a
statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required
to protect a clientfromthe substantial undue prejudicial effect
of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyers
client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be
limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the
recent adverse publicity.
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as witness.
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial m which the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the trial in which
another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a
witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.
Rule 3 A Special responsibilities of a prosecutor.
The prosecutor m a criminal case shall.
(a) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor
knows is not supported by probable cause;
(b) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has
been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining,
counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain
counsel;
(c) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a
waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a
preliminary hearing;
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection
with sentencing, disclose to the defense all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective
order of the tribunal; and
(e) Exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law
enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting
or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from
making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would
be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6.
Rule 3.9. Advocate in nonadjudicative proceedings.
A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is m a representative capacity and
shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a) through (c),
3.4(a) through (c), and 3.5.
TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN
CLIENTS
Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in statements to others.
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly*
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule
1.6.
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Rule 42. Communication with person represented by
counsel*
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is
authorized by law to do so. This rule does not apply to
communications with government parties unless litigation
about the subject of the representation is pending or imminent. Communications with elected officials are permissible
when litigation is pending or imminent after disclosure of the
representation to the official.
Rule 4*3. Dealing with unrepresented person.
(a) During the course of a lawyer's representation of a
client, the lawyer shall not give advice to an unrepresented
person other than the advice to obtain counsel.
(b) In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that
the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
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(a) A partner in a lawfirmshall make reasonable eff
ensure that thefirmhas in effect measures giving rea*»*w?
assurance that the person's conduct is compatible^mhTiZ
professional obligations of the lawyer,
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over t3w
nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that tkl
person's conduct is compatible with the professional oblijrZ
taons of the lawyer, and
(c) A lawyer 3hall be responsible for conduct of such
person that would be a violation of the Rules of Profeama^
Conduct if engaged m by a lawyer if:
(1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the speafU
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) The lawyer is a partner m the law firm in which tf*
person is employed, or has direct supervisory authonty o w
the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when it»
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
reasonable remedial action.

Rule 4.4. Respect for rights of third persons.
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or
burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence
that violate the legal rights of such a person.
LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS
Rule 5.1. Responsibilities of a partner or supervisory
lawyer.
(a) A partner in a lawfirmshall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that thefirmhas in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:
(1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the
other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authonty
over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to
take reasonable remedial action.
Rule 5.2. Responsibilities of a subordinate lawyer.
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct
notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of
another person.
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a
supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of a question of
professional duty.
Rule 5.3. Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants.
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or
associated with a lawyer

Rule 5.4. Professional independence of a lawyer.
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a
nonlawyer, except that.
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyers firm,
partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money,
over a reasoriaDle period of time after the lawyer's nooth, to
the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal
business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the
deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation
which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased
lawyer, and
(3) A lawyer or lawfirmmay include nonlawyer employees
in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is
based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer
if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice
of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends,
employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services 5*
another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering sucn legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a
professional corporauon or associauon authorized to practice
law for a profit, if:
( D A nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a
fiduciary representauve of the estate of a lawyer may hold the
stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during
administration.
(2) A nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) A nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the
professional judgment of a lawyer.
(e) A lawyer may practice m a non-profit corporation which
is established to serve the public interest provided that the
nonlawyer directors and officers of such corporauon do not
interfere with the independent professional judgment of the
lawyer.
Rule 5.5. Unauthorized practice of law.
A lawyer snail not:
(a) Practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction: or
(b) Assist any person in the performance of activity that
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 5.6. Restrictions on right to practice.
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

1053

SUPREME COURT RULES OP PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

(a) A partnership or employment agreement that restricts
the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon
retirement; or
(b) An agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's
right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy
between private parties.

Bale 7.4

(b) Is likely to create an unjustified expectation about
results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the
lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law; or
(c) Compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers'
services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.

PUBLIC SERVICE
Role 7.2. Advertising.
Rule 6.1. Pro bono publico service.
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A
lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited
means or to public service or charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal
system or the legal profession, and by financial support for
organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited
means.
Rule 6.2. Accepting appointments.
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal
to represent a person except for good cause, such as:
(a) Representing the client is likely to result in violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonablefinancialburden on the lawyer; or
(c) The client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as
to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship of the
.awyer's ability to represent the client.
Rule 6.3. Membership in legal services organization.
A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal
services organization, apart from the law firm in which the
lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization
serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the
lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a
decision or action of the organization:
(a) If participation in the decision would be incompatible
with the lawyer's obligations to a cheat under Rule 1.7; or
(b) Where the decision could have a material adverse effect
on the representation of a client of the organization whose
interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer, or on the
representation of a client of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm.
Rule
ests.6.4. Law reform activities affecting client interA lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an
organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests
of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the
interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a decision
in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that
fact but need not identify the client.
INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES
Rule
7.1. Communications concerning a lawyer's services.
A lawyer shall not mak* a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or
omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered aa a
whole not materially misleading;

(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a
lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a
telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor advertising, radio or television, or through
written or recorded communication.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written
communication shall be kept for two years after its last
dissemination along with a record of when and where it was
used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for
recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may
pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule and may pay the usual charges of
a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service
organization.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall
include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its
content
Role 7.3. Direct contact with prospective clients.
(a) A lawyer may not solicit, ln-person, professional employmentfroma prospective client with whom the lawyer has no
family or pnor professional relationship, when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyers pecuniary gain.
The term "in-person" includes m-person and telephonic communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not
include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed
generally to persons not known to need legal services of the
kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who
are so situated that they might in general find such services
useful.
(b) A lawyer may not solicit, by mail or other written
communication directed to a specific recipient concerning a
specific cause of action, professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship under the following circumstances:
(1) The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that
the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer;
(2) The person has made known to the lawyer a desire not
to receive communications from the lawyer; or
(3) The communication involves coercion, duress, or harassment
Rule 7.4. Communication of fields of practice.
A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer will
accept employment in specified areas of practice. A lawyer
whose practice is limited to specified areas of practice may
communicate that fact. A lawyer shall not hold himself out
publicly as a specialist and shall not indicate any certification
or designation as a specialist, except as follows:
(a) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States
Patent and Trademark office may use the designation "patent
attorney or a substantially similar designation; and
(b) In accordance with any plan regulating lawyer specialization approved and promulgated by the Utah Supreme
Court.
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Rule 7.5. Firm names and letterheads.
(a) A lawyer shall not use afirmname, letterhead or other
professional designation that violates Rule 7.1. A trade j)*™*
may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does not imply
a connection with a government agency or with a public or
charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise in
violation of Rule 7.1.
(b) A lawfirmwith offices in more than one jurisdiction may
use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of
the lawyers in an office of thefirmshall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the
jurisdiction where the office is located.
(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be
used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its
behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is
not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a
partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.
MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION
Rule 8.1. Bar admission and disciplinary matters.
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(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Profestuaw.
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do %*
through the acts of another,
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely QQ g^
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer m
other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraua, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the sdzninistr*.
tion of justice;
(e) State or imply an ability to influence improperr* •
government agency or official;
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct
that is a violation of applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct »
other law, or
(g) Engage in sexual relations with a client that exploit the
lawyer-client relationship. For purposes of this subdivision:
(1) "Sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or the
touching of an intimate part of another person for the purpose
of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse; and
(2) Except for a spousal relationship or a sexual relationship that existed at the commencement of the lawyer-client
relationship, se:cual relations between a lawyer and a cheat
shall be presumed to be exploitative. This presumption it
rebuttable.

An applicant for admission to the Bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a Bar admission application or in connection
Rule 8J5. Jurisdiction.
with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a) Knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject
Ob) Fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misappre- to the disciplinary authonty of this jurisdiction although
hension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or engaged in practice elsewhere.
knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information
from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this
Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise CHAPTER 14. RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND
DISABILITY
protected by Rule 1.6.
Rule &2. Judicial officials,
(a) A lawyer shall not make a public statement that the
lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a
judge, adjudicatory officer, or of a candidate for election or
appointment to judicial office.
(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall
comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Rule 8JJ. Reporting professional misconduct.
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authonty.
(b) A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed
a violation of the applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office
shall inform the appropriate authority.
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
(d) This rule does not require disclosure of information
provided to or discovered by members of the Utah State Bar
during the course of their work on the Lawyers Helpmg
Lawyers Committee, a committee which has as its purpose the
counseling of other bar members about substance abuse or
psychological or emotional problems.
Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

Summary.
Rule
1. Purpose, authonty, scope and stricture of lawyer disciplinary and disability proceedings.
2. Definitions.
3. Ethics and discipline committee.
4. Disciplinary counsel.
5. Expenses.
6. Jurisdiction.
7. Roster of lawyers.
8. Penodic assessment of lawyers.
9. Grounds for discipline.
10. Prosecution and appeals.
11. Proceeding subsequent tofindingof probable cause.
12. Sanctions
13. Immunity
14. Service.
15. Access to disciplinary information.
16. Dissemination of disciplinary information.
17. Additional rules of procedure.
18. Interim suspension for threat of harm.
19. Lawyers convicted of a cnme.
20. Discipline; by consent.
21. Resignation with discipline pending.
22. Reciprocal discipline.
23. Proceedings m which lawyer is declared to be incompcten
or alleged to be incapacitated.
*
24. Reinstatement following a suspension of six xnontns
less.
- gsx
25. Reinstatement following a suspension of more than
months; re admission.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Von Lester TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant
No. 910496.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 24,1997
Defendant pled guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to death, by the District Court, Coalville Department. Frank
G. Noel. J. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court Durham. J., held that. (1) trial counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance by misinforming defendant about likelihood of preventing evidence regarding dropped charges from entering
into penalty phase of homicide prosecution; (2) defense counsel did not have conflict of interest based on philosophy of
role of defense counsel, (3) defense counsel conducted adequate mitigation investigation: (4) defense counsel did not
have conflict of interest based on minimal compensation; and (5) defense counsel's closing argument was adequate.
Affirmed.
Stewart, Associate C J., filed a dissenting opinion.
[1] CRIMINAL LAW <@=*1158(1)
110kll58(l)
Supreme Court defers to trial court's findings of fact after hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claim. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6; Rules App.Proc., Rule 23B.
[2] CRIMINAL LAW <©=*641.13(1)
110k641.13(l)
Supreme Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel claims under two-part analysis: defendant must demonstrate
that counsel's performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness; and defendant must show that absent
counsel's errors, he had reasonable chance to prevail, and thus errors undermine confidence m outcome. U.S.CA.
ConstAmend. 6.
[31 CRIMINAL LAW <§=*641.13(1)
110k641.13(l)
When reviewing counsel's performance, on ineffective assistance of counsel claim, court must indulge strong
presumption counsel's conduct falls within wide range of reasonable professional assistance. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 6.
(41 CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.13(5)
110k641.13(5)
Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by misinforming defendant about likelihood of preventing evidence
regardmg dropped charges from entering into penalty phase of homicide prosecution, evidence supported finding that
counsel correctly mformed defendant about scope of penalty phase, at plea hearing defendant heard prosecution say it
intended to introduce evidence of dismissed charges and defense counsel objected, and defendant twice told court during
plea proceedings that he was satisfied with counsel's performance. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
[51 CRIMINAL LAW <®=>1158(1)
110kll58(l)
Tnal court's findings of fact are "clearly erroneous" when they are against clear weight of evidence.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.
Copr. e West 1998 No Claim to Ong U S. Govt. Works
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[6] CRIMINAL LAW <®=>64U3(H)
110k641.13(2.1)
^ m S S S S K ^ J ?

°! ? f a X "**

M not

« * * wtth his dutv torepresentdefendant in

[61 CRIMINAL LAW <S=»641.13(5)
110k641.13(5)
^

X

S

^

"

J

?

°f * * « « " * « «* « « t o " * ^ duty torepresentdefendant »

[7] CRIMINAL LAW <@=641.5( 5)
110k641.5(5)
Right to counsel encompasses nght to counselfreefromconflicts of interest. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6
[8j CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.5(.5)
110k641.5(.5)

[91 CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.5(.5)
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110k641.13(7)
Defense counsel must investigate potential mitigation by mental disease or extreme mental disturbance, in sentencing
phase of capital prosecution, where defendant claims to have suffered from mental illness at time of crime or to have
suffered serious mental illness previously U.S.C.A. ConstAmend 6.
[15] CRIMINAL LAW <®=*641.13(7)
110k641.13(7)
Attorney does not have obligation to introduce mitigating evidence in sentencing phase of capital prosecution, if she
believes after thorough investigation that it will harm the case or if other strategic reasons for its omission exist.
U.SC.A. Const Amend. 6
[16] CRIMINAL LAW <§=>641.13(7)
110k641.13(7)
Failure to investigate mitigating factors in sentencing phase of criminal prosecution can constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel only where such factors actually exist and may be productively uscxi m penalty phase. U S C.A.
Const. Amend. 6.
[17] CRIMINAL LAW <®^>641.5(.5)
110k641.5(.5)
Defense counsel did not have conflict of interest, in capital murder prosecution, based upon fact that he received only
minimal compensation; defendant failed to present evidence that his defense suffered, and counsel had substantial
income from other sources. U.S.C A. ConstAmend. 6.
[18] CRIMINAL LAW <®=»641.13(2.1)
110k641.13(2.1)
Capital murder defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's closing argument:
although minimal, argument was reasonable. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
[19] CRIMINAL LAW <@=*641.13(1)
110k641.13(l)
For purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel claim, attorney's performance need only be reasonable, and range of
reasonableness is broad. U S.C A. ConstAmend. 6
*683 Jan Graham, Atty. Gen.. J. Frederic Voros. Ji., Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert W Adkins, Coalville, Tern' L.
Christiansen. Park City, for plaintiff and appellee.
J. Bruce Savage. Park City, for defendant and appellant.
DURHAM. Justice:
We hear this appeal from a capital conviction pursuant to section 78- 2-2(3)(i) of the Utah Code. Defendant Von Lester
Taylor pled guilty to two counts of capital murder m 1991. After a sentencing hearing, the jury returned two verdicts
imposing the death sentence. Taylor appealed the sentence and subsequently fired bis attorney, Elliot Levme. Taylor
mamtamed his appeal with new counsel assertmg claims of inadequate representation at tnaL In 1994, when the matter
came before this court the first tune, we remanded it to die tnal court to hold a rule 23B hearmg on the mefiective
assistance of counsel claims and collateral claims. We now have the results of that hearmg and treat all issues raised in
the appeal.
The facts of the underlying cranes are as follows: In December 1990. Taylor left a halfway house where he was
housed while on parole after imprisonment for aggravated burglary Subsequently, Taylor and Edward Steven Dek
broke into the Tiede family cabm near Beaver Springs. Utah, while the Tiedes were m Salt Lake City Once in the
cabm. Taylor called a friend and told him that he intended "to shoot some people." Shortly *684 thereafter, Mrs. Tiede
Copr. 3 West 1998 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works
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Taylor's interests in Satanism and witchcraft as well as previous drug abuse One of the psychological evaluations did
say that Taylor showed signs of antisocial personality disorder with schizoid personality features, but Levme determined
that the negative information about Taylor's character and behavior would offset anv potential benefit froin suggesting
the existence of a personality disorder The court found that Levme's decision to omit mental health testimony fell
within the broad range of reasonable professional judgment Levme did not obtain Taylors school record's but did ask
Tavlor about his school days Levme also failed to obtain Taylor's health records, his juvenile court records, and his
familv's psychological records He did not interview Taylor's friends or family members other than his mother and
father Taylor, on the other hani has failed to provide any evidence that if Levme had performed any of the suggested
investigations, the outcome of the trial would have differed He does not even suggest what such investigation would
have revealed and how the revelations would have unproved his position with the jury The court found that Levme s
performance did not fall below the reasonableness threshold
[1][2][3] We defer to a trial court's findings of fact after a rule 23B hearing State v Huggms, 920 P 2d 1195, 1198
(Utah Ct App 1996) From diese facts, we must decide whether Taylor received ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [FNl] See id. This court reviews Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance questions under a two-part analysis (1) The defendant must demonstrate that
counsers performance " fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' ", and (2) he must show that absent
counsel's errors, he had a reasonable chance to prevail, and thus the errors undermme confidence m the outcome State
v Templm, 805 P 2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 688.104 S.CL 2052,
2064, 80 L £ d 2 d 674 (1984)). When reviewing counsel's performance, ' 'a court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within die wide range of reasonable professional assistance " Id at 186 (quoting Strickland
at 689 104 SCt at 2065)
rN 1 Tavlor did not advance a claim under the Utah Constitution

I MISINFORMATION ABOUT SCOPE OF PENALTY PHASE
[4] Taylor claims that Levme specifically told him that the sentencing hearing would exclude all evidence about the
dropped charges of attempted homicide, aggravated arson, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbeiv, theft etc Tavlor
argues that the trial court's factual finding that Levme did not misinform Taylor about the likelihood of preventing this
evidence from entering into the penalty phase was cleariv erroneous
[5] We consider a trial court's findings of fact clearly erroneous *hen thev 'are against the clear weight of the
evidence " State v Walker. 743 P 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) Evidence presented at the rale 23B hearing supports the
finding diat Levme correctlv mfonned Taylor about the scope of the penaltv phase Levme testified that he told Tavlor
that the penalty phase would resemble very closely a guilt phase but that Levme could possibly prevent the State from
introducing certain inflammatory photographs as evidence. The transcript of the plea proceedings supports Levme's
version and undermines Taylor's testimony to the contrary At the plea hearing, Tavlor heard the prosecution say that it
intended to introduce evidence of the dismissed charges Levme registered his inteut to object to such evidence When
asked by the court if he was satisfied with Levme's performance. Tavlor responded *686 affirmatively on two occasions
during the plea proceedings Although the judge could have found Tavlor credible at the rule 23B heanng, he did not.
and enough evidence supports die judge's finding to pievent us from holding it cleariv erroneous Hence;. Levme did not
misinform Taylor or provide ineffective assistance of counsel m this manner
n CONFLICT IN DEFENSE ROLE
[6] [7] [3] [9] [10] Taylor claims tiiat Levme's philosophv about the role of a defense attornev conflicted with his dutv to
represent Tavlor, resulting in an involuntarv guiltv plea and prejudicing the outcome of the penaltv piiase The ngnt to
counsel encompasses ' rthe nght to counsel free trom conflicts of interest' * State v Webb, 790 P 2d 65. nl
(Utah Ct App 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U S at 688L 104 S Ct at 2064), denial of habeas aff d sub nom bv Webb
v Van Der Veur. 853 P 2d 898 (Utah Ct App 1993) and bv Webb v Van Der Veur 67 F 3d 312 (10th Cir 1995)
Copr £ West 1998 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works
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investigation or another psychological exam. In other cases where failure to conduct a psychological exam has been
held to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel the defendants had a history of senous mental illness and could show
how an investigation would have furthered their defenses. See, e.g., Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 596-97 (5th
Cir.1990) (subsequent history on other grounds omitted) (discussing various cases of ineffective assistance when
attorney knew defendant had previously been hospitalized for mental illness). A defendant must show not only that
counsel failed to seek mitigating evidence, but also that some actually existed to be found. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d
523, 534 (11th Cir.1985) ("[Defendant] has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probabdity that he would have
received a lesser sentence but for [attorney's] complete failure to search out mitigating character evidence. As the
district court found, Tetitioner has demonstrated that no favorable evidence was sought and that some was in fact
available.' " (quoting Blake v. Zant 513 F.Supp. 772 (S.D.Ga.1981))). Taylor has not suggested a helpful strategy that
would have been supported by evidence not known to Levine. Failure to investigate mitigating factors can constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel only where such factors actually exist and may be productively used in the penalty
phase.
One of the problematic aspects of this case is the evolving nature of standards for adequate defense of a capital
prosecution. The State appears to suggest in its bnef that an extensive mitigation workup or investigation may not
always be necessary (apparently such investigations were not universally undertaken in Utah at the tone this case was
tried). We are troubled by that proposition if it is intended to suggest that a less-than-adequate investigation will suffice.
We hold here diat Levme's mitigation investigation, although very limited, appears to have been adequate; there are no
indications that he overlooked anything useful m Taylor's background. We emphasize that the failure to perform an
adequate mitigation workup represents ineffective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate that counsel made an
unreasonable judgment m not pursuing an investigation further, a defendant must identify potentially mitigating
circumstances that the investigation would have uncovered. See, e.g., Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 286 n. 6 (Utah
1995) (holding that where defendant did not introduce psychological report containing potentially mitigating evidence at
effectiveness hearing, court cannot make judgments about its contents). Defense attorneys need not present all evidence
*688 uncovered by a mitigation workup, but they absolutely must perform one.
m . CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESULTING FROM MINIMAL COMPENSATION
[17] Taylor aiso suggests diat Levme's minimal compensation created a per se conflict of interest preventing him from
giving Taylor adequate assistance of counsel. Taylor argues that flat fee compensation encourages lawyers to spend as
little time on a case as possible and to promote plea bargains. We acknowledge that the problem of inadequate
resources for defending capital cases creates significant potential for harm. [FN2] But Taylor has failed to allege, let
alone identify, anything in diis particular case to support the theory that his defense suffered [FN3] At no tone did
Levine 3ay, "We can't afford to have you psychologically tested," or anything of the kmd. Moreover, Levme personally
had substantial mcome from other sources during die period he represented Taylor and knew he could obtam extra
compensation from the county if needed. Taylor did not introduce any evidence regarding other demands on Levme's
tone or point to inadequacies in the tone spent on this case. Without this information, we must accept the lower court's
assessment that Levme's mcome and resources did not affect his strategy and efforts in this case. Hence, under the
conflict of interest standard discussed in part II above, Tayior has failed to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest.
FN2. Sec Douglas W Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services aid Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 Buff.
L.Rev. 329 (Fall 1995). Poor compensation for capital defease attorneys appears to attract poor attorneys as evidenced by the rate
of disciplinary action and disbarment for these attorneys tn various states. Id. at 398 ALJO, many capital defense attorneys lack
general experience and have not received the training needed to defend a client in "one of the most specialized fields of practice in
American iaw." Id. at 398-99 Furthermore, because of the minimal pay, attorneys often fail to spend the time needed to prepare
for a case. Id. at 402-03. Insteaa. JI order to survive econowncaily, they must take on other cases that also demand time. Id. This
ack of preparation becomes parnculariv apparent in sentencing proceedings where attomevs fail to present mitigating evidence
that does exist. Id. at 403-04; see aiso Anthonv Paduano) & Clive A. Stafford Smith, ITic Unconscionabdity of Sub-Mmimum
Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases. 43 Rutgeirs L.Rev. 281. 283 (1991) (exammmg whether statutorily set fees for
capitai detense attomevs remunerate lawvers so poorrv that losing is more profitable than doing "everything possible to prevent a
guiitv verdict and death sentence')

Copr. C West 1998 No Claim to Ong. U S. Govt. Works

947P.2d681
(Citeas:947P.2d681,*688)
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FN3. We make no judgment about the efficacy of this arsum-*;. ^
uicacy oi uus argument m other cases with more evidence or in a system-wide challenge.
IV. CUMULATIVE ERROR
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Amendment claim. He has qJSL
£ * ^ f / ^ ^ I Amcndments ' T ^ 1 » «*r «* Sixth
effect on the outcome ofte^^'^tto^^^Z*
*?** ***—» * * had "* ^P816111
to suggest mitigating cireumS « * ^ t S Z 2 ^ l K " 5 ? ^
^ " ^ m d to BW"r ""» * b
re^theobservattonth^
Fatness
^
l
5
^
As T^lor suggests, Uvme's closntg ardent w «
world but then f a ^ T c o i m e c X ' s t o r ^ ^ ! ™ *?"? ' "*"* A m e r i c a n *»? *«* h o w *"* c a m e *» * '
although he did say * ? £ m ^ l ^ ^ ^ 1
^ e ^ « < ^ the jtny directly to spare his client's life,
aggraTting f a c t o T m e ^ ^ J ^ ^ E T * " ; • * « f *« * " « * * b « ^ »***»l « *
emphasized that Taylor b k S ^ S ^
^ * "* nnp0SSlble b * " * *<* ^ to d o * «y"»7- He
Taylor, hie ^ * ^
d
^
^ g ^ a c t o r s he ha, u . Taylors rel*ve y o ^ c L S T ^ ^ V S ^
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,nasneanl all the witnesses, and has received the applicable instructions. Some jurors
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may already have made up their minds Oral argument builds on this base of information and attempts to operate on the
hearts and minds of the jurors Persuasion depends greatly on the quality of the interpersonal dynamic between counsel
and the juiy There are nuances to oral communication that cannot be reflected on tiie printed page Levme, havmg
become acquainted with the jurors, may have decided that aggressive advocacy would liave alienated or offended them,
he may have been convmced that a low- key, minimalist approach would elicit their sympathy We acknowledge that
Levme's argument is so minimal as to represent the lower threshold of reasonableness and that if he had had any more to
work with m the evidence or his client we might have reached another result Given the nature of the crime and
substantial evidence against Taylor, however, even the finest ciosmg argument is not bkely to have saved him from the
death penalty The few mitigating circumstances operating m this case fall well below the level needed to offset the
vicious character of his crimes In our judgment the understatement of Levme's ciosmg argument did not lead to the
death penalty for his client
CONCLUSION
As noted, Levme's representation of Taylor does not illustrate ideal defense attorney behavior Taylor, however, was
not the ideal defendant Taylor voluntarily pled guilty to committing hemous crimes yrcthout provocation, and the State
had irrefutable, detailed *690 evidence of those cranes The chances that Taylor would have fared any better had the
best criminal defense attorney in the country made the perfect argument are slim Foir this reason, Taylor cannot show
prejudice related to Levme's performance Similarly, with regard to his conflict of interest claims, Taylor failed to show
an actual conflict The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ZIMMERMAN C J, and HOWE and RUSSON, JJ, concur in Justice DURHAM'S opinion
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting
There is no question that this case involves exceptionally wanton and hemous murders, and there is no question that
defendant was the perpetrator Nevertheless, whether the death penalty should be imposed was a question to be decided
solely by the juiy, but only after all the requisite legal procedures and requirements liad been complied with Defense
counsel's failure to meet those requirements resulted m defendant's bemg denied the effective assistance of counsel as
required by the Sixth Amendment Strickland v Washington. 466 U S 668, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed.2d 674 (1984),
State v Templm, 805 P 2d 182 (Utah 1990)
The majority opinion states that "[d]efense attorneys absolutely must perform" a "mitigation workup " That was not
done in this case The majority opinion characterizes defense counsel's mitigation investigation as "very limited'' but
"adequate " Id. I cannot agree that it was adequate Defense counsel did not conduct an m-depth mvesugation of
defendant's psychological history and condition It is simply not sufficient that the attorney knew about some of
defendant's childhood psychological problems, his learning disorder, and substance abuse in his family All those
factors and possibly others that may have seriously affected defendant's character were simply not explored in anv
meaningful way for the purpose of providing some evidence that would weigh in favor of a life sentence It may be that
nothing would have come from an adequate mitigation workup that would have persuaded a jury to reach a different
conclusion as to the appropriate penalty, but it is not possible to know what might have been discovered had defense
counsel done his job
Furthermore, defense counsel clearly should have been disqualified from representing defendant and any other capital
defendant because of his failure to adhere to fundamental professional standards of competence and conduct See State
v Holland. 876 P 2d 357 (Utah 1994) (discussing and disapproving defense counsel's personal approach and strategy in
conducting defense of criminal cases), see also id at 361 (opinion of Stewart Assoc C J, & Durham, J) Indeed,
defense counsel's ciosmg argument to the jury, to the extent it even addresses issues somewhat pertinent to the case, is
more a self- justification of defense counsel than a plea that the jury impose a life sentence rather than death
In mv view, the death penalty should be vacated and the case remanded for another penalty hearing to take place alter
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an appropriate mitigation workup has been conducted by competent ^""^1
END OF DOCUMENT
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STATE OF UTAH,
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Plaintiff/Appellee

vs.

CASE NO.
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Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-2-3 (i).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did

the

trial

court

abuse

its

discretion

in

denying

Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea?
The

Court

should

review

this

case

using

an

"abuse

of

discretion" standard, State vs. Mildenhall. 787 P. 2d 744, (Utah,
1987).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case is governed in part by Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which was at the time of the plea codified as
Title 77, Chapter 35, Section 11(e), Utah Code Annotated.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's denial of
Motion

to

Withdraw

Guilty

Pl e a

submitted

appellant on the 9th day of June, 1994.

by

the

a

defendant/

The motion was denied by

two separate rulings; one dated June 29, 1994 and a supplementary
ruling dated July 12, 1994.
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Eighth District
Court for Uintah County, State of Utah on the 18th of February,
1986 with two counts of Aggravated Kidnapping
Section 76-5-302 Utah Code Annotated.

in violation of

Each count also provided a

Firearms Enhancement Provision pursuant to Section 76-3-203 Utah
Code.

On February 26, 1986 the Defendant/Appellant plead guilty

to Count One of the Information.
dismissed.

Count Two of the information was

The record does not reveal that any affidavit was used

to assist the court in an explanation of Defendant/Appellant's Rule
I K e ) rights at the time of plea.

After a colloquy with the

Honorable Richard Davidson, the court accepted the guilty plea.
The matter came before the court for sentencing on the 26th day of
March, 1986, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding.

The Defendant/

Appellant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory sentence at the Utah
State Prison of

15 years to

life with

a firearm

enhancement

requiring an additional 5 to 10 years to be served consecutively

with the 15 years to life sentence-

On May 20, 1987 at the request

of the Chairman of the Board of Pardons, the court reviewed the
Defendant/Appellant's sentence.

The court, the Honorable Dennis

Draney presiding, re-affirmed the sentence originally imposed-

On

June 9, 1994, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
before the Eighth District Court.

The plea was defective in that

the elements of the offense were not explained to Defendant/
Appellant.

It was further defective in that the trial court did

not give the Defendant/Appellant the proper maximum punishment, nor
explain the nature of the Utah indeterminative sentencing. Counsel
for the Defendant/Appellant's performance was inadequate in that
he did not explain any of the required Pre-requisites to a valid
plea-

The information was defective in that it did not adequately

identify any victim of the alleged crime.

Counsel's performance

was also deficient in that he also did pursue any information to
cure the defective

information.

All the prior judges having

retired, resigned, or being deceased, the case was re-assigned to
the Honorable John R- Anderson.

Judge Anderson issued a summary

ruling to the motion to dismiss, the State having given no response
to the motion. That ruling, dated June 29, 1994 denied all aspects
of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea excepting for a
response by the State the issue of an inadequate explanation of
the firearms enhancement.
on July

After considering the State's response,

12, 1994 and giving

the Defendant no opportunity to
3

consider the State's response, Judge Anderson issued a ruling
denying the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea in its
entirety stating that the court had substantially complied with the
requirements of Rule 11(e).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
is in error.

The court made no findings that the appellant waived

his right to self incrimination.

The court made no findings that

the appellant understood the nature and elements of the crime and
that

his

plea

admitted

each

and

every

element.

The court

incorrectly advised the defendant as to the maximum sentence which
could be imposed.

The information was deficient in that it did not

advise the Defendant/Appellant of the identity of the victims.
Defendant/Appellant was deprived of key elements of effective of
counsel

in

that

no

discovery

was

requested,

discussed

with

Defendant/Appellant, nor were there any attempts to explain the
sentencing, or cure the defective information.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE IT FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH RULE 11(e) OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect
at the time appellant made his guilty plea as codified in 77-3511(e) provided as follows:
The court . . . shall not accept a (plea of guilty) until the
4

court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2)

That the plea is voluntarily made;

(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all
of those rights;
(4)
That the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea;
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5)
That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6)
Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what
agreement has been reached.
The record of the entry of pleas is very limited.

From the

record, it appears that no plea affidavit was used, therefore the
court can only determine the trial court's compliance with rule
11(e) based on the oral representations made in open court.
That record is bereft of any discussion with the appellant on
several

critical

points

included

in

the rule.

There

is no

discussion whatsoever with the appellant concerning his right
against compulsory self incrimination as required by subsection (3)
of the rule.

There is no discussion of the nature and elements of

the offense of aggravated kidnapping with a firearms enhancement
as required by Subsection 4 of the rule.

5

There is no discussion

or record that the guilty plea was an admission to each of the
elements of the alleged crime as required by subsection 4 (Record
PP 4-7).
The record also reveals that the trial judge affirmative misrepresented to the appellant the maximum sentence possible as a
result of the plea.

Subsection 5 of the rule required a finding

that

understands

the

defendant

possible sentence.

both

the minimum

and maximum

At line 12, page 7 of the record, the trial

judge informed the appellant that a one to five year enhancement
was possible in addition to the five years to life he originally
explained.

No correction of that error was made.

The appellant

was sentenced to a five to ten year firearm enhancement in direct
contradiction to what had been explained.
The standard of review as previously stated is that of an
"abuse of discretion1' by the court.

The companion cases of Warner

vs. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah, 1985) and Brooks vs. Morris, 709
P. 2d 310, (Utah, 1985), established the standard by which a trial
court accepts guilty pleas.

The Supreme Court stated that a

failure of to advise a defendant of his rights concerning selfincrimination was not alone sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea
provided

that

the record as a whole

showed that

requirements were substantially complied with.

the rule 11

Subsequently the

Supreme Court in State vs. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah, 1987)
replaced

the

"substantial

compliance" standard.

compliance"

rule

with

a

"strict

It has been ruled that the Gibbons rule was

not retroactive, however the concepts set forth in Gibbons are

useful.
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Here as well, we have not only a failure to

inform appellant of the maximum sentence, but a misrepresentation
by the court as to the maximum sentence.

WHen coupled with the

failure to discuss the elements of the offense, the combination is
fatal to the trial court's ruling that the requirements had been
substantially complied with.

Finally, even though there was some

discussion of some of the RUle 11 requirements at the time the plea
was

entered, no

knowingly made.

findings were made except that

the plea was

(Record p 8).
POINT II

THE PLEA WAS IMPROPERLY TAKEN BECAUSE THE INFORMATION
DID NOT ADEQUATELY INFORM THE DEFENDSNT/APPELLANT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CHARGES.
The information to which the Defendant/Appellant alleges as
follows:
Count : AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, in violation Section
76-5-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, on or
about February 17, 1986, in Uintah County, Utah, a First
Degree Felony;
The said defendant at the time and place aforesaid
did intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law
and against the will of the victim, by any means and in
any manner, seized, confined, detained, or transported
the victim with intent:
a. To hold for ransom or reward, or as shield
of hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in
particular conduct; or
b.
To facilitate the commission, attempted
commission, or flight after commission or attempted
commission of felony; or
c. To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize
the victim or another. . . .
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and that the filing of a bill of particulars is normally one of the
proper remedies to an inadequate information, that statement only
illustrates another issue which will be addressed later in this
matter, that is, the ineffective assistance of counsel.
The lack of identity of the victims illustrates again the
inadequacy of the inquiry at the time of the taking of his plea.
It has already been

stated that the record

is bereft of any

discussion of the elements of the offense charged. Because no bill
of particulars was filed, the Defendant/Appellant did not have a
more specific information that the original one which was filed.
There is no indication that any request for discovery was ever
filed nor that any discovery was given to the defendant.

All of

these things which might have had some curative effect upon the
lack of the notice in the information did not occur.

The failure

to explain the elements of the crime, and to get a factual basis
for the plea become even worse.
POINT 3
THE INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL FURTHER IMPAIRED
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE PROCEEDINGS
WHEN THE GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN.
The performance of defense counsel in adequately representing
his client

is always a difficult

issue

in that much

of any

representation is not on the record. The attorney client privilege
makes

it difficult

for an attorney

to respond to ineffective

assistance accusations, nevertheless there is guidance on what
constitutes

ineffective

assistance

of counsel.

In

state v.*,

Moritzsky, 771 P 2d. 689 (Utah App. 1989), Defense attorney Lance
10

Wilkerson, the then Uintah County Public Defender, was found to
have ineffectively assisted his client by failing to explore or
request

any

instruction concerning

the defense of habitation.

Citing State v. Verde, 770 P 2d. 116 (Utah
court stated the following test:

1989) the appellate

"Defendant's Sixth Amendment

challenge to his conviction will be successful only if he can prove
that

(1)

his

counsel

rendered

and

objectively

deficient

performance, demonstrated by specific acts or omissions; and (2)
counsel's

error

prejudiced

the

defendant,

i.e.

a

reasonable

probability' exist that but for counsel's omissions, the verdict
would have been more favorable to defendant.
While the court must not second guess tactical decisions made by
counsel, the tactical analysis has little relevance in this case.
In this case, Uintah County Public Defender Lance Wilkerson
failed to request discovery.

He failed to request a bill of

particulars to clarify or cure an information that was devoid of
notice of the identity of the alleged victim.
the elements of the charge to his client.

He failed to explain

He failed to assist the

court in establishing any factual basis for the entry of this plea.
He failed to explain the nature of the firearm enhancement which
was charged and sentenced to his client.

He failed to appeal the

errors in this plea immediately upon sentencing.
The

specific

acts or omissions

required have been

shown

precisely by the inadequacy of the record in this case. The second
prong is harder to address because this is

guilty plea case.

To

adequately assess whether a trial verdict would have been more
11

favorable to defendant/appellant than his plea is difficult.

I

must be noted however that since the defendant/appellant receive
the maximum sentence allowed by law for one count of aggravate
kidnapping,

and

the

statutory

preference

was

for

concurren

sentences at the time, it is hard to say that no better resul
could have been obtained for the Defendant,
CONCLUSION
The record in this case shows affirmative mistakes by th
court and counsel in the taking of appellant's plea.
show

strict

approaching

compliance,
the

required

It does nc

substantial

compliance,

or

standard.

The

was

process

anythin
furthe

complicated by defense counsel's ineffective performance in th
process of the plea. Since the information was defective in notic
to the defendant, the problem grew even worse.

Appellant heret

prays that the court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motic
to

Withdraw

Guilty

Plea

and

remand

the

case

for

proceedings.
DATED this

/—

day of

Ap^t ^

, 1996.

Alan M. Williams
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WAYNE S. TIPPETT,
Appellant,

)
)
)
)

v.

)

FRED VANDERVEUR,

)

Appellee.

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF
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Case#990178-CA

)
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT I

ORIGINAL
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
I

STATE OF UTAH

3
4

STATE OF UTAH,

5
6
7
8
9
10

PLAINTIFF,
VS.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
ARRAIGNMENT

WAYNE STEVEN TIPPETT AKA
TOM PETERSON, TERRELL
DANN KELLY, STEVE WAYNE
TIPPETT, DANIEL MITCHELL
KELLEY,
DEFENDANT.

CASE NO. 86-CR-14U

11
12
13
U
15

BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON TEE 26TH DAY OF
JANUARY, 1986, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:00 A.M., THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE DISTRICT
COURTROOM OF THE UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE, VERNAL, UTAH;

16

SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD BY TEE HONORABLE RICHARD C. DAVIDSON,

17

JUDGE IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH.

18

A P P E A R A N C E S

19
20

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

MARK W. NASH, ESQ.
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
152 EAST 100 NORTH
VERNAL, UTAH 84078

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

LANCE T. WILKERSON, ESQ.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
319 WEST 100 SOUTH, SUITE A
VERNAL, UTAH 84078

21
22
23
24
25

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

JUL 221988
DOROTHY LUCK, CLERK
BY

<S@-t*r-

ncPMTY

I II

PROCEEDINGS

2
3 ||

THE C O U R T :

BE ON T H E RECORD IN CASE NUMBER

8 6 - C R - 1 4 , STATE OF UTAH V. W A Y N E STEVEN TIPPETT, TERREL
5 II DANN K E L L Y , STEVE WAYNE T I P P E T T , DANIEL MITCHELL KELLEY.
6

COME F O R W A R D , P L E A S E .

7

THE RECORD WILL I N D I C A T E THE DEFENDANT IS P R E S E N T ,

8

T O G E T H E R WITH C O U N S E L , MR. W I L K E R S O N .

THIS IS THE TIME F O R

9

A R R A I G H M E N T , THE PRELIMINARY H E A R I N G HAVING BEEN WAIVED

10 || D O W N S T A I R S IN CIRCUIT C O U R T , AND THE MATTER HAVING BEEN
II II BOUND O V E R TO THIS C O U R T .
MR. W I L K E R S O N :

A R E YOU READY TO PROCEED?
IN THIS MATTER THERE'S BEEN A PLEA

13 || A R R A N G E M E N T ARRIVED AT IN T H I S C A S E .

THE DEFENDANT INTENDS

U

TO E N T E R A PLEA TO COUNT I, A N D THAT COUNT II WILL BE

15

DISMISSED.

16

A T T O R N E Y HAS AGREED TO R E C O M M E N D THAT IN THE EVENT THE

17

D E F E N D A N T IS TRANSPORTED TO A N O T H E R FACILITY OUTSIDE OF THIS

18

S T A T E , NAMELY THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA IS PROBABLY T H E

19

M O S T L I K E L Y , THAT HE W O U L D RECOMMEND THAT THE DEFENDANT

20

R E C E I V E TIME F O R — C R E D I T FOR T I M E SERVED THERE AGAINST HIS

21

S E N T E N C E HERE IN THIS S T A T E , AND THAT FURTHER THAT THERE HAS

IT SHOULD B E F U R T H E R NOTICED THAT THE COUNTY

22 I BEEN NO REPRESENTATIONS AS TO W H A T WILL HAPPEN TO ANY O T H E R
22 J C H A R G E S THAT MAY BE P E N D I N G IN ANY OTHER JURISDICTION, SUCH
24

AS SALT LAKE COUNTY OR T H E F E D E R A L AUTHORITIES OR WITH THOSE

25

IN SOUTH CAROLINA.

-2-

THE C O U R T :
2

MR>

II

NASK:

IS THAT THE UNDERSTANDING, MR. NASH?
THAT IS C O R R E C T , YOUR HONOR.

WELL, I

3 I WOULD L I K E T O PUT ON THE RECORD T H A T I DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY
4

AND DO N O T A T THIS TIME ATTEMPT T O SPEAK FOR A N Y OTHER

5

5 || J U R I S D I C T I O N , EITHER SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES
6

OR SOUTH C A R O L I N A .

7

IN C I R C U I T C O U R T YESTERDAY.

8

ASSUMING H E IS SENTENCED TO TIME IN THE PENITENTIARY, I

9

WILL R E C O M M E N D T O THE COURT T H A T IN THE EVENT H E IS

I HAVE MADE THE DEFENDANT A W A R E OF THAT
I W O U L D , HOWEVER, RECOMMEND,

10

TRANSFERRED T O ANOTHER PENITENTIARY THAT HE BE GIVEN CREDIT

11

FOR TIME SERVED IN THAT OTHER PENITENTIARY AGAINST HIS UTAH

12

ScNTENCE.

14

T H A T ' S T H E ONLY RECOMMENDATION THAT I A M PREPARED

OR WILL M A K E A S TO SENTENCING.

ANYTHING ELSE I HAVE MADE NO

AGREEMENTS T O ASK FOR LENIENCY

O N THE SENTENCING ON COUNT I

5 II IN ANY R E S P E C T .
16

THE

"

COURT:

THIS BEING THE TIME FOR A R R A I G N M E N T ,

17 II LET U S P R O C E E D .
18
19

EXAMINATION

20 || BY THE C O U R T
21

'I

Q

F I R S T OF ALL IS WAYNE TIPPETT YOUR TRUE AND CORRECT

23

A

W A Y N E STEVEN TIPPETT,

24

Q

?OU ARE KNOWN B Y T H E S E OTHER ALIASES LISTED HERE

22 || NAME?

25

ON THE INFORMATION?

-3-

A

YES, SIR.

Q

WAYNE STEVEN TIPPETT IS YOUR TRUE AND CORRECT NAME?

A

YES, SIR.

Q

IS IT S-T-E-V-E-N?

A

YES.

Q

FOR THE RECORD, MR. TIPPETT, ARE YOU SUFFERING

FROM THE EFFECTS OF ANY ALCOHOL OR DRUGS AT THIS TIME?
A

NOT TODAY.

I WAS ON METHODOME IN SALT LAKE, BUT

I AM NO LONGER.
Q

ALL RIGHT.

YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT THIS PROCEEDING

A

YES, SIR.

Q

YOU UNDERSTAND YOU ARE BEING CALLED UPON TO MAKE

IS?

A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY?
A

YES, SIR.

Q

ARE YOU PREPARED TO GO FORTH WITH THIS MATTER?

A

YES.
THE COURT:

HAVE YOU BEEN FURNISHED WITH A COPY OF

THE INFORMATION?
MR. WILKERSON:
THE COURT:

Q

YES WE HAVE, YOUR HONOR.

DO YOU WAIVE THE READING OF THAT?

MR. WILKERSON:

YES.

(BY THE COURT)

YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. TIPPETT, THAT

YOU ARE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING IN
VIOLATION OF 76-5-302.

THAT'S A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, WHICH

-4-

ALLEGES THAT YOU AT THE TIME AND PLACE DID TAKE CONTROL OF
PEOPLE AND CAUSE THEM TO BE TRANSPORTED AGAINST THEIR WILL.
YOU HELD THEM UNDER YOUR CONTROL AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND
THAT IN FACT YOU DID UTILIZE A FIREARM IN THE COMMISSION OF
THAT OFFENSE.

YOU ARE AWARE OF THAT CHARGE?

A

?ES, SIR.

Q

ARE YOU PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO ENTER A PLEA TO

THAT CHARGE?
A

YES, SIR.

2

WHAT PLEA DO YOU INTEND TO ENTER?

A

GUILTY.

Q

PRIOR TO ACCEPTING A GUILTY PLEA, MR. TIPPETT, I'M

SURE THAT YOU ARE

AMARE

THAT YOU HAVE CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS WHICH ARE VERY VALUABLE AND YOU HAVE TO WAIVE THOSE
RIGHTS BEFORE I CAN ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA.

THE FIRST AND MOST

OF THOSE RIGHTS IS YOUR RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
THAT'S THE REASON MR. ^ILKERSCN IS PRESENT TODAY.

HE OR

ANOTHER ATTORNEY WOULD REPRESENT YOU TODAY AND AT THE TRIAL
OF THIS MATTER, AND EVEN ON THE APPEAL LEVEL IF IT WENT THAT
FAR.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE THAT RIGHT?
A

YES, SIR.

G

YOU UNDERSTAND NOBODY CAN TAKE THAT RIGHT FROM YOU,

THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO THAT AND IT'S A RIGHT GIVEN BY THE
STATE?
A

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?
YES, SIR.

M

C

2
3

DO YOU UNDERSTATED THAT YOU ALSO HAVE A RIGHT TO A

TRIAL IN THIS MATTER, A TRIAL 3Y JURY?
||

5

A

YES, SIR.

Q

WHEREIN THE STATE WOULD HAVE TO GO FORWARD AND

PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THIS OFFENSE BEYOND A

6

REASONABLE DOUBT TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL EIGHT JURORS,

7

AND ALL EIGHT JURORS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE ON YOUR GUILT BEFORE

8

YOU COULD BE FOUND GUILTY.

9

10

A
||

YES, SIR.
D0 Y

Q

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

°U UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE AT THE TIME OF

11

TRIAL THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EMAMINE THE WITNESSES BROUGHT AGAIN3"
12

YOU?

THAT IS, YOUR COUNSEL.

FURTHERMORE, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT

3 II TO COMPULSORY PROCESS TO BRING ANY WITNESSES TO TELL YOUR
14 II SIDE OF THE STORY, TO PUT ON YOUR CASE.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND

'5 II THAT?
6

||

!7

A

YES.

Q

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IF YOU GO THROUGH THIS

18

TRIAL AND IF YOU WERE CONVICTED 3Y THE JURY THAT YOU EVEN

19

HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS MATTER TO THE UTAH STATE SUPREME

20

COURT, AND YOU ARE GIVING THAT RIGHT UP AS WELL AS THESE

21

OTHER VALUABLE RIGHTS I? YOU PLEAD GUILTY?

22 ||

A

YES.

3 !l

2

MR. TIPPETT,

OTHER THAN THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT I

2-

AND THE PRESENTATIONS MADE 3Y THE COUNTY ATTORNEY HERE TODAY

2

IN OPEN COURT, HAS ANYBODY PROMISED YOU ANYTHING TO GET YOU

- j

1

TO MAKE THIS PLEA?

2

A

NO, SIR.

3

Q

ANYBODY THREATENED YOU IN ANY WAY?

4 I!

A

NO, SIR.

5

Q

ARE YOU MAKING THIS PLEA OF YOUR OWN FREE WILL AND

CHOICE?

6

7

A

YES, SIR.

9I
I

Q

¥OU UNDERSTAND THAT BEING A FIRST DEGREE FELONY

o | CARRIES WITH IT A SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE IN THE
,0

UTAH STATE PRISON?

n

A

YES, SIR.

12 J

Q

IT ALSO CARRIES WITH IT A FIREARM ENHANCEMENT

PENALTY OF NOT LESS THAN ONE OR UP TO FIVE YEARS ON TOP OF
M

|| THAT.

15

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

A

io {I

YES, SIR.
MR. NASH:

YOUR HONOR, I WOULD POINT OUT, AND THE

COURT SHOULD INFORM THE DEFENDANT, I BELIEVE THAT THE
18 ,j AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING CARRIES A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE
AS WELL, WHICH IS FIVE, TEN, FIFTEEN, DEPENDING ON THE
2c 'I SENTENCING.
2' ||

Q

(BY THE COURT)

YOU UNDERSTAND AN AGGRAVATEP

KIDNAPPING IS A MINIMUM MANDATORY OF FIVE, TEN, FIFTEEN
YEARS AT THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT?

25 II

A

YES, SIR.

Q

YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

1

A

YES,

SIR.

2

Q

HAS A N Y B O D Y MADE ANY REPRESENTATIONS TO YOU ABOUT

3 II WHAT THIS C O U R T MAY OR MAY NOT DO IN THE WAY OF SENTENCING?

5 ||

A

NO.

Q

YOU U N D E R S T A N D NOBODY CAN MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS

6

THAT A R E YOU IN A N Y W A Y BINDING ON THIS COURT IN SENTENCING,

7

THIS IS MY JOB AND N O B O D Y ELSE'S?

8
9

A

Y E S , SIR.

Q

A R E YOU M A K I N G THIS PLEA BECAUSE YOU ARE IN FACT

i0 || GUILTY OF THE C R I M E OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING?

12

j|

A

Y E S , SIR.

Q

MR. T I P P E T T , HAVING IN MIND THE RIGHTS THAT I HAVE

13

EXPLAINED TO Y O U , AND THE POSSIBLE PENALTIES YOU ARE LOOKING

U

AT, TO C O U N T I, THE C R I M E BEING AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, WHAT

15

IS YOUR PLEA?

16
17

18

A

GUILTY.
THE COURT:

T H E COURT WILL ACCEPT T H E GUILTY PLEA,

FINDING T H A T IT IS KNOWINGLY M A D E .

'9

W H A T IS YOUR DESIRE AS TO SENTENCING?

20

MR. W I L K E R S O N :

W E L L , YOUR HONOR, IN THIS MATTER

21

DUE TO THE D E F E N D A N T ' S PRIOR RECORD HE WOULD LIKE TO BE

22

SENTENCED TODAY IF T H A T WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

23

UP TO THE C O U R T TO D E C I D E WHETHER IT HAS ENOUGH INFORMATION

24

AVAILABLE.

25

THE COURT:

OF C O U R S E , IT'S

M R . NASH?

-3-

MR. NASH:

YOUR HONOR, THE STATE DOES NOT FEEL

IT'S PREPARED AT THIS Tll'JE TO PROCEED WITH SENTENCING,
BECAUSE OF THE BRIEF TIME WE HAVE HAD TO WORK ON THIS.

WE

HAVEN'T RECEIVED ALL TEE INFORMATION WZ NEED OUT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS, AND WE WILL REQUEST THE
MATTER BE REFERRED TO ADULT PR03ATION AND PAROLE FOR A
PRE-SENTENCE REPORT.
THE COURT:

YOU HAVE A RIGHT, MR. TIPPETT, TO BE

SENTENCED NOT SOONER THAN TWO DAYS FROM TODAY AND NOT LATER
THAN THIRTY DAYS.

WHAT IS YOUR DESIRE IN THIS MATTER?

MR. WILKZRSCN:

WELL, HE IS SOMEWHAT ANXIOUS TO GET

I THE SENTENCING OVER WITH.
THE WITNESS:

I WANT TO GET SENTENCED TO GET BACK

| TO SOUTH CAROLINA AND START GETTING ON THE TIME.
BUT AS FAR AS CHECKING INTO MY BACKGROUND, I HAVE
A PRETTY GOOD WORK RECORD AND EVERYTHING IN SALT LAKE UP
UNTIL THE LAST YEAR OR SO.

SO I DON'T KNOW IF IT WOULD 3E

BETTER FOR ME TO GO AHEAD AND DO A CHECK, JUST GO ON AND
SENTENCE.

THAT'S MY PROBLEM.

SO I DON'T REALLY KNOW.

I'LL

TAKE HIS RECOMMENDATION.
THE COURT:

YOU UNDERSTAND BY SENTENCING YOU TODAY,

HAVING NO OTHER INFORMATION, THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE I HAVE IS
INCARCERATION?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

I REALIZE THAT.
I THINK IT BETTER IN YOUR BEST

INTEREST TO HAVE THIS MATTER REFERRED AND HAVE A REPORT
PREPARED.

I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG THAT WOULD TAKE.
MR. WILKERSON:

I WOULD THINK THEY COULD DO IT

WITHIN THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD.
THE COURT:

I WOULD THINK SO EASILY WITHIN THIRTY

DAYS, AND IF THEY COULD GET IT DONE SOONER WE COULD TAKE
CARE OF THIS MATTER SOONER.
MR. WILKERSON:

OKAY.

I THINK THAT WOULD ALSO

GIVE THE COURT—GET SOME BACKGROUND ON WHAT HAPPENED.
THERE WAS NO INJURY OR ANYTHING DONE TO THE VICTIMS.
WERE NOT HELD FOR A VERY LONG PERIOD OF' TIME.

THEY

IT MAY BE WELI

IF THE COURT WAS AWARE OF THE FACTUAL SITUATION, TOO.

THAT

WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF HE WERE SENTENCED TODAY.
THE COURT:

LET'S REFER THIS MATTER TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE FOR THE PREPARATION
OF A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT.

IS THAT AGREEABLE WITH YOU, MR.

TIPPETT?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

THAT WILL BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.

AS SOON AS THAT HAS BEEN PREPARED AND CIRCULATED LET'S BRING
IT BACK UP HERE.

WE'LL FIM SENTENCING TENTATIVELY FOR TWO

LAW AND MOTION DAYS FROM NOW.
THE CLERK:

MARCH 26TH.

THE COURT:

MARCH 26TH.

IF IT'S DONE SOONER THAT

WILL TAKE CARE OF IT SOONER THAN THAT.

THANK YOU.

MR. NASH:

YOUR HONOR, AS TO COUNT II, THE STATE

WOULD AT THIS TIME MOVE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT II.
THE COURT:

YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT?

MR. WILKERSON:
THE COURT:

NO OBJECTION.

COUNT II IS DISMISSED.

(WHEREUPON THIS ARRAIGNMENT WAS CONCLUDED.)
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3
4

REPORTER'S CERTI-FTr**??
5
6
7
8

I* MILO N. HAR.MON, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT
REPORTER IN THE FTrwnnT TTT*™
i ^ .IGniK JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH DO
K E E S Y CERTI?Y THAI

9

™

« ° < * AND FOREGOING

BY ME STENOGRAPHICA-Y REPORTED AT THE TEES AND PLACES
10

HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME «AS SUBSE^NTtY BY ME
1 1
12
13

14
15
16

CAUSED TO BE REDQCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FOR., CONSISTS OF PAGE*
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A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENT
ADDUCED, AND PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE.
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FRED VANDERVEUR,
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RANDY A. HUDSON #1565
DEPUTY UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
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FILED
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
.

VS .T*

ntA /v

„

DANIEL TERR3L KELLEY
AKA: TOM PETERSON, TERREL DANNY
KELLY, STEVE WAYNE TIPPETT,
DANIEL MITCHELL KELLEY
DOB:8/28/52, 9/28/52,

CASE NO.

f(n

O^rf*)

Defendant.
T h e u n d e r s i g n e d RICK HAWKINS, under o a t h s t a t e s on
i n f o r m a t i o n and b e l i e f t h a t the defendant committed the crimes
of:
COUNT I :
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, i n v i o l a t i o n of S e c t i o n
7 6 - 5 - 3 0 2 , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , 1 9 5 3 , as amended, on or about
February 17, 19 86, in Uintah County, Utah, a F i r s t Degree Felony;
The s a i d Defendant a t the time and place a f o r e s a i d
d i d i n t e n t i o n a l l y or k n o w i n g l y , w i t h o u t authority of law and
a g a i n s t t h e w i l l of the v i c t i m , by any means and in any manner,
s e i z e d , c o n f i n e d , d e t a i n e d , o r t r a n s p o r t e d t h e v i c t i m with
intent::
a.
To h o l d f o r ransom or reward, or as a s h i e l d
of h o s t a g e , or t o compel a t h i r d person to engage in p a r t i c u l a r
conduct or to forbear from engaging in p a r t i c u l a r conduct; or
b.
To f a c i l i t a t e t h e c o m m i s s i o n , a t t e m p t e d
c o m m i s s i o n , or f l i g h t a f t e r commission or attempted commission of
a f e l o n y ; or
c.
To i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on or to t e r r o r i z e
the v i c t i m or another.
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT, i n v i o l a t i o n of S e c t i o n
7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , 1 9 5 3 , as amended/ on or about
February 17, 19 86, in Uintah County, Utah;
The s a i d D e f e n d a n t a t the time and place a f o r e s a i d
did u
u ss ee a f i r e a r m o r a f a c s i m i l e of a f i r e a r m or t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a firearm in t h e commission or furtherance of
the Felony offense alleged in Count I.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Robert G. JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant
No.900598-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 19,1991.
Defendant was convicted in the Second District Court, Weber County, Ronald 0 Hvde. J., of six felonv counts of
securities fraud, six felony counts of sale of unregistered securities, and one felony count of employing unregistered
securities agent and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood. J., held that. (1) defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel dne to counsel's conflict of interest and (2) defendant's purported waiver of conflict-free counsel
was not valid and did not preclude his claim of ineffective assistance.
Reversed and remanded for new tnal.
[1] CRIMINAL LAW <§=> 1134(3)
HOkl 134(3)
While ordinarily claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be addressed by collateral attack through habeas corpus
proceedmgs, claim may be raised on direct appeal in limited circumstances, such as when mere a n e w counsel on
appeal and there is adequate tnal record. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 6.
12] CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.5(.5)
110k641.5(.5)
Formerly 110k6415
Right under Sixth Amendment to have assistance of counsel for one's defense in cnmmal prosecution guarantees all
cnmmal defendants nght to effective assistance of counsel, and includes nght to counsel free from conflicts of interest.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
[2] CRIMINAL LAW @s»641.13(l)
110k641.13(l)
Right under Sixth Amendment to have assistance of counsel for one's defense in cnmmal prosecution guarantees all
cnmmal defendants nght to effective assistance of counsel, and includes nght to counsel free from conflicts of interest.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
[3] CRIMINAL LAW <§=»641.13(1)
110k641.13(l)
Purpose of nght of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that criminal defendants receive fan* tnals. but while
defendant should be afforded fair opportunity to hire attorney of his choice, that nght is not absolute. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
141 CRIMINAL LAW <®»641.5(7)
110k641.5(7)
Standard for analyzing Sixth Amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest differs from that used for other
ineffective assistance of counsel claims: defendant who did not object to conflict at tnal has burden on appeal of
demonstrating with specificity that actual conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his lawyer's performance.
and if such showing is made, prejudice will be presumed. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
[5] CRIMINAL LAW <®=»641.5(.5)
Copr S> West 1998 No Claim to Ong. U S. Govt Works

Pan* 2

823P.2d484
(Cite as: 823 P.2d 484)

110k641.5(.5)
Formerly 110k641.5
Defendant being prosecuted for violations of state securities law was denied effective assistance of counsel as result of
conflict of interest of his trial counsel who was implicated as conspirator in testimony of State's chief prosecution
witness and in prosecutor's closing argument: effect of conflict was evidenced in counsel's questioning of chief
prosecution witness, his failure to call defendant as witness, and his failure to object to comments of prosecutor during
closing argument. Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(d); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
[6] CRIMINAL LAW <@=>641.13(1)
110k641.13(l)
Counsel's conduct may be examined in light of prevailing professional and ethical standards to determine whether
defendant received effective representation. U.S.C A Const.Amend 6.
[7] CRIMINAL LAW <®^641.10(1)
110k641.10(1)
Test for determining on appeal whether attorney should have been disqualified from case because of appearance of
impropriety is two-pronged: first, court must find that there is at least reasonable possibility that some specifically
identifiable impropriety occurred because of representation, though proof of actual wrongdoing is not necessary, and
second, court must balance likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy against social interest in allowing defendant to
continue beingrepresentedby lawyer of his choice. Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(d).
[81 CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.5(7)
110k641.5(7)
Defendant's purported waiver during pretrial proceeding of any potential conflict of interest arising from his
representation by trial counsel did not preclude defendant's claim of ineffective assistance based upon counsel's
implication as coconspirator during trial, because waiver was based onrepresentationscontrary to what actually
happened at trial and incomplete knowledge of possible consequences. U.C.A.1953,61-1-1,61-1-3,61-1- 7,61-1-21:
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
[9] CRIMINAL LAW <§=>641.5(7)
110k641.5(7)
Defendant can generally waive his right to conflict-free counsel, but to be valid decision must be knowing and
intelligent and made only after adequate warning by trial court of potential hazards posed by conflict of interest and of
accused's right to other counsel; validity of waiver depends upon whether defendant knew enough about possible
consequences to make informed choice. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
[10] CRIMINAL LAW <®=*64L5(7)
U0k641.5(7)
Trial courts have discretion to grant waiver ofrightto coaflict-free counsel and are not expected to foresee all possible
events which may take place during trial. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
[11] CRIMINAL LAW <®»641.5(7)
110k641.5(7)
Trial courts can refuse to accept defendant's waiver of oonflict-free counsel where there is either actual or potential
conflict of interest between defendant and counsel. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 6.
*486 Michael F. Olmstead (argued), Ogden. for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam. State Atty. Gen. and Kenneth A Bronston, Asst. Atty. Gen.. Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellee.
Before GARFF. GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ.
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OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Robert G. Johnson appeals his conviction of six felony counts of securitiesfraudin violation of Utah Code
Ann- §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1- 21 (1989), six felony counts of sale of unregistered securities in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§61-1-7 and61-l-21 (1989), and one felony count of employing an unregistered securities agent in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3(2) and 61-1-21 (1989). He appeals on the basis that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel at trial. We reverse and remand. [FN1]
FN1. Defendant also raises other issues on appeal which we do not reach because of our resolution of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.

BACKGROUND
As a result of a criminal investigation by the Utah Attorney General's Office, defendant was arrested and charged bv
information with thirteen felony counts of securities violations. He retained attoraev Joseph Bottum to represent him.
Pursuant to its investigation, the State had reason to believe that Bottum had substantial knowledge of and had
participated in one of the transactions which formed the basis of the charges against defendant. The State anticipated
presenting evidence in that regard at trial including possibly calling Bottum as a witness. The State filed a pretrial
motion informing the court of the possible conflict of interest between defendant; and Bottnm. In its motion, the State
requested that the court order Bottum and defendant to state on the record the nature and extent of the conflict and to
explain to defendant the potential effect on his defense if Bottum were called to testify at trial The State moved the
court to either allow defendant to waive the conflict or to disqualify Bottumfromlurther representog defendant.
The State attached to its motion an affidavit of Ed Morin, an investigator with the Utah Division of Securities, who had
investigated die transactions that resulted in defendant's charges. The affidavit contained the Mowing statements.
Monn had obtained evidence that Bottum knew about and participated in the planning of the investment program in
question. Bottum received cash from defendant to purchase stock or an interest in a company that was to be merged
with another company and sold. The transaction would provide profits to the participants, including Bottum, defendant
the investors, and others. When Bottum was unable to complete the transaction, he returned over $50,000 in cash.
which defendant had collected, to defendant for further use in the scheme. Morin also stated that the State alleged that
*487 the completed transaction constituted the sale of unregistered securities and thatfraudulentand false statements
were made in connection with the sale of the investment. In its accompanying memorandum, the State said it planned to
present this evidence at trial
The court held a hearing on the State's motion. At the hearing, Bottum represented to the court that he had no
knowledge of or involvement in the transactions. He stated that he "had nothing to do with [the sale of securities]," and
that he knew of no reason why he would be called to testify. The State discussed the information it had showing thai
Bottum was involved. The State indicated Bottum would not be called as a witness by the prosecution, but that other
witnesses would testify about Bottom's involvement. Bottom, however, repeatedlv contended that he "was at a loss tc
understand what they're talking about." He stated that if the State were correct, there would be "a tremendous problem
for [his] client" but if such evidence were presented at triaL defendant could rebut all of it and exonerate Bottum
through his testimony. After being informed that evidence might be introduced at trial implicating Bottum, and thai
Bottum would not be able to take the stand to refute it defendant told the court he still wished to have Bottum represem
him.
At trial the State's chief prosecution witness was Blake Adams. Adams had originally been charged as a co-defendan
with defendant but had pleaded guilty. Adams testified tint defendant introduced him to Bottum and that the three oi
them formed a partnership. He testified that he and defendant met with Bottum in Bottum's law office where Bottun
told diem he knew of a company which could be purchased through stock acquisition and then merged with anothe:
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company. Bottum told them he had access to the company or an individual who controlled the company. Bottum
offered to take care of the filings and have the stock traded properly. Defendant and Adams were to raise the money.
Bottum. defendant and Adams would split the proceeds in thirds. Adams further testified that as part of the deaL they
used funds from their partnership in the form of a check made out to Joseph Bottum Trust Account. Adams testified
that the scheme "was a [defendant], Adams and Bottum thing." In his closing argument the prosecutor recounted
Adams's testimony about Bottum's involvement.
On appeal defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment due
to a conflict of interest between him and his attorney. He argues that his waiver during the pretrial hearing is invalid
because a defendant as a matter of law, cannot waive such a conflict.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
[1] While ordinarily a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be addressed by collateral attack through habeas
corpus proceedings, in limited circumstances, the claim may be raised on direct appeal. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d
1027,1029 (Utah 1991); United States v. Swanson. 943 F.2d 1070,1072 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Tatum. 943
F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir.1991); Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-34 (3d Cir.1984). Those
circumstances exist when there is new counsel on appeal and there is an adequate trial record. Zepp, 748 F.2d at
133-34. Wefindboth present in this case, and therefore proceed to consider the merits of defendant's claims.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is usually a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182.
186 (Utah 1990) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 698. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
Although there are no fact findings as to the ineffectiveness of counsel here, the record of what actually transpired
allows us to determine on appeal, as a matter of law, whether defense counsel's performance constituted ineffective
counsel Zepp, 748 F 2d at 133-34.
[2] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal *488 prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." This right guarantees all criminal defendants
the right to effective assistance of counsel, Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. and "includes the right to counselfreefrom
conflicts of interest." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at
2065).
[3] The purpose of therightto effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that criminal defendants receive fair trials.
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. While a defendant "should be afforded a fair opportunity" to hire the
attorney of his or her choice, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,53, 53 S.Ct. 55,58,77 LJEd. 158 (1932), thatrightis not
absolute. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692. 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); United States v.
Collins, 920 F.2d 619,625 (10th Cir.1990) cert, denied, 500 U.S. 920, 111 S.Ct. 2022. 114 L.Ed.2d 108 (1991) (citing
United States v. Gipson. 693 F.2d 109, 111 (10th Cir.1982) cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1216, 103 S.Ct. 1218, 75 L.Ed.2d
455 (1983)). Therightto effective assistance of counsel seeks to "guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal
defendant" Wheat, 108 S.Ct. at 1697, and is paramount to a defendant'srightto be represented by an attorney of his or
her choice. "Courts therefore must balance a defendant's constitutional right to retain counsel of his [or her] choice
against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, the public's confidence in the integrity
of the judicial process and the orderly administration of justice." Collins, 920 F.2d at 626 (citations omitted).
The right to effective assistance of counsel is "so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as
harmless error." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173. 1181. 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (quoting
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18. 23. 87 S.Ct. 824, 827- 28. 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); State v. Velarde. 306 P.2d
1190. 1192 (Utah App.1991).
Conflict of Interest
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[4] "[A] sixth amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest is a special subtype of an ineffectiveness claim" and
must be analyzed under the following standard, which is different than that used for other ineffective assistance of
counsel claims Velarde, 806 P 2d at 1192, Webb, 790 P 2d at 72 A defendant who did not object to the conflict at
trial has the burden on appeal of demonstrating with specificity that "an actual conflict of interest existed which
adversely affected his [or her] lawyer's performance " Webb, 790 P 2d at 73 (quoting Cuvler v Sullivan, 446 U S 335,
348, lOOSCt 1708 1718,64 L Ed 2d 333 (1980)), Zepp, 748 F 2d at 135-36 (citmg Wood v Georgia. 450 U S 261
271, 101 S Ct 1097, 1103, 67 L EA2d 220 (1981)) If the defendant makes <mch a showing, prejudice need not be
demonstrated to prevail on the claim Cuyler, 446 U S at 349-50, 100 S Ct at 1718-19, Webb, 790 P 2d at 73 The
court will presume the defendant was prejudiced b> the lawyer's performance United States v Cronic. 466 U S 648
658, 104 S Ct 2039, 2046, 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984), Webb, 790 P 2d at 73 (quotmg Strickland, 466 U S at 692, 104
SCt at 2067)
[5] Utah appellate decisions have addressed counsel's conflict of interest only m die context ofrepresentationof
miiltiple clients and a potential conflict of interest among those clients No Utah cases have presented facts where, as
here, the alleged conflict of interest is between the lawyer and the client We therefore look to other jurisdictions to
determine if an actual conflict of interest exists here, and if so, whether it adversely affected counsel' 5 performance We
find Zepp, 748 F 2d 125, and United States v Hobson, 672 F 2d 825 (11th Cu ) (per curiam), cert denied, 459 U S
906, 103 SCt 208 74 L Ed 2d 166 (1982), particularly helpful
In Zepp, defendant was arrested and charged with possession of cocame and destruction of evidence following a
warrantless sweep search of her home After the search, she was taken to police headquarters The results from the
search were negative Later, defense counsel and *489 defendant went to defendant's residence and closed the front
door Moments later police officers heard a toilet flush several tunes Three days later, the officers obtained a search
warrant for the septic tank connected to the house Forty plastic bags were found dunng the search, twenty of which
tested positive for cocame residue
Defense counsel was called as a prosecution witness for the government at a pretrial suppression hearing He objected
and thereafter entered into a stipulation with the government wherein he stated that he did not use any of the bathrooms
while he was mside defendant's house The stipulation was introduced into evidence at trial On appeal, die court held
that defendant's Sixdi Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because her counsel faced
potential criminal liability on the same charges for which she was being tried ind because he acted as a prosecution
witness Id at 136
The court stated that "when defense counsel has independent personal informationregardingthe facts underlying his
client's charges, and faces potential liability for those charges, he has an actual conflict of interest," which may hkeh
impair his professional judgment Id. In such a situation, a court cannot assume that a lawyer "vigorously pursued his
client's best interest entirelyfreefromthe influence of his own concern to avoid his own incrimination" Id The lawyer
must either withdraw or be disqualified. Id.
Similarly, m Hobson* defendant appealed his convictioa of drug trafficking on the ground that a conflict of interest
between him and his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel The affidavits of
two witnesses implicated defendant's attorney as a coconspirator in the transportation of marijuanafromPanama to the
United States The court upheld the district court's disqualification of defense counsel because if the evidence indicating
defense counsel's involvement in the crime were presented at trial, defense counsel's credibility and integrity would be
impugned, which would likely be detrimental to defendant Hobson, 672 F 2d at 828-29
[6] Zepp, Hobson and other conflict of interest cases have also dis^^sH ethical standards under the Rules of
Professional Conduct [FN2] While violation of the Rules does not "create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached" or provide a basis for civil liability, Scope. Utah R.Prof Conduct courts have referred to the Rules to
augment legal principles involving lawyer conduct The amplication of ethical standards to particular facts is a question
of law See Hobson. 672 F 2d at 828 Counsel's conduct may be examined m light of prevailing professional and
Copr © West 1998 No Clanm to Ong U S Govt Works

Page 6

823P.2d484
(Citeas:823P.2d484,M89)
ethical standards to determine whether defendantreceivedeffective representation. Zcpp,748F.2d at 135.
FN2. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the eariier Utah Canons of Professional Responsibility.

Rule 1.7(b) of die Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by... the lawyer's own
interest unless: (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected, and (2) Each
client consents after consultation
Also, in order to continue representation under Rule 1.7(b), the client's representation must not appear to be adversely
affected by the lawyer's other interests. Code Comparison, Utah RJProf.Conduct 1.7. The Comment notes to this rule
explain that where the "probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or
impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice n Comment, Utah ILProf.Conduct 1.7.
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) addresses die institutional interest in ensuring that just verdicts are rendered
in cnmmal cases-an interest that may be jeopardized by die existence of conflicts of interest Wheat, 108 S.Ct at 1697.
Courts *490 have an "interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession
and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." Id. Rnk 8.4(d) states: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to .~ engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice* When a lawyer engages in
irresponsible or improper conduct, the public's confidence in the bar and in the legal process is eroded. Hobson, 672
F.2d at 828. This is especially true when a lawyer's integrity is impugned before a jury. Id. at 829.
[7] In Hobson. the court articulated a two-pronged test for determining on appeal whether an attorney should have been
disqualified from a case because of an appearance of impropriety. Although die test was based upon Canon Nine of the
former Canons of Professional Responsibility, wefindthe test appropriate under the current Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct. First, the court must find that there is "at least areasonablepossibility that some specifically identifiable
impropriety" occurred because of therepresentation.Id. (quoting Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804,
813 (5th Cir.1976)). There need not be proof of actual wrongdoing, however. Id. at 829. Second, the court must
balance "the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy11 against the social interest in allowing the defendant to continue
being represented by the lawyer of his or her choice. Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828 (quoting Woods, 537 F.2d at 813 n. 12).
"[T]he interest m permitting a cnmmal defendant to retain counsel of his choice is strong and deserves great respect.
The right to counsel of choice is not absolute, however, and must give way where its vindication would create a serious
risk of undermining public confidence in die integrity of our legal system." Hobson. 672 F.2d at 828. An attorney
should be disqualified if both prongs are satisfied. Id. [FN3]
FN3. It is also apparent that Bottum could have, and perhaps should have, been called as a witness. Utah Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.7(a) states:
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a tnai in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where. (1) The
testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case;
or (3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client

In applying die foregoing principles to this case, we note that Zepp and Hobson present facts similar to those herein.
Bottum was implicated as a coconspirator m Adams's testimony and in the prosecutor's closmg argument. He had an
interest m exonerating himself which was not consistent with defending his client. Also, Bottum's integrity and
credibility as defense counsel as well as personally, were eroded by the accusations, making him less effective m
representing defendant. These facts demonstrate an actual conflict of interest between Bottum and defendant. The
conflict clearly affected Bottum's performance as defense counsel. The effect of the conflict was evident m his
questioning of Adams, his failure to call defendant as a witness, and his failure to object to comments of the prosecutor
during closmg argument. Ethical considerations also lead to the conclusion that an actual conflict of interest existed
between Bottum and defendant and that he ought not to have acted as counsel. He had a personal interest in vindicating
himself which was not consonant with the interests of his client. Implications that Bottum was a participant m illegal
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activities not only lessened his effectiveness as counsel for defendant, but also discredited die system under which
defendant was tned. Because we find that there was an actual conflict of interest between Bottum and defendant and
that the conflict affected Bottum's performance as counsel, we presume defendant was prejudiced thereby
Waiver
[8] Defendant purportedly waived any potential conflict of interest during the pretrial proceeding. Defendant argues
that his waiver is invalid because, as a matter of law, he is unable to waive such a conflict
[9] A defendant can generally waive his or her right to conflict-free counsel. Holloway, M91 435 U.S. at 483 n. 5, 98
S Ct. at 1178 n. 5. To be valid, such a waiver must be knowing and intelligent md made "only after adequate warning
by the [tnal] court of the potential hazards posed by the conflict of interest and of die accused's right to other counsel"
Umted States v Rodriguez, 929 F 2d 747, 750 (1st Cir 1991) (per curiam). The validity of a waiver depends upon
whether die defendant knew enough about die possible consequences to make an mfonncd choice. Umted States v
Roth, 860 F 2d 1382,1387-88 (7th Cir.1988) cert denied, 490 U.S. 1080,109 S.Ct 2099,104 LJEA2d 661 (1989).
[10][11] Tnal courts have die discretion to grant a waiver and are not expected to foresee all the possible events which
may take place during tnal See Roth, 860 F.2d at 1387-89. Tnal courts can refuse to accept a defendant's waiver
where there is either an actual or a potential conflict of interest between defendant and counsel. Wheat 108 S.Ct at
1698-99 Tnal courts have an "institutional interest m protecting the truth-seeking function of the proceedings over
which [they are] presiding by considering whether [defendants have] effective Jissistance of counselregardlessof anv
proffered waiver[s] " Umted States v Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir.) cert denied, 501 U.S. 1211, 111 S.Ct
2812, 115 L£d.2d 984 (1991).
We ore sensitive to the possibility that a defendant may seek a waiver and then try to use it to his or her advantage later.
vVe do not condone such manipulation. In this case, however, Bottum's denial to the tnal count during the pretrial
hearing of any knowledge or involvement m die sale of securities was not borne out Bottum said that he had not
participated in die transactions and could refute any implications with defendant's testimony. At tnal, however,
prosecution witness Adams was adamant about Bottum's involvement Bottum did not call defendant as a witness and
therefore neither he nor any other witness was able torebutthis evidence. Defendant was advised during the pretrial
hearing that Bottum would not be able to act both as counsel and as a witness, but was never told of die possible
deletenous effects on the jury if his defense counsel were implicated in the same H*»nfoigs constituting criminal activity
as was he. Therefore, die waiver does not preclude defendant's ineffective assistance claim because it was based on
representations contrary to what actually happened at tnal and incomplete knowledge of die possible consequences
When the conduct occurred during trial, defendant was not then fully informed of die possible consequences and did not
then have an opportunity to make a voluntary and informed waiver. [FN4] Therefore, die waiver was not valid and does
not preclude defendant's chum of ineffective assistance of counsel.
FN4 While we do not go so far. Hobaon held a defendant may not waive a conflict cf interest where "the ethical violation involves
public perception of the lawyer and the legal system rather than some difficulty in the attorney's effective representation...." 672
FJ2dat829

CONCLUSION
Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because of the ineffectiveness of his counsel resulting
from an actual conflict of interest. His pretrial waiver of any potential conflict did not extend to what occurred at tnal
when the actual conflict crystallized. Wereverseand remand for a new tnal.
GARFF and RUSSON, JJ, concur.
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ORME, Presiding Judge:
Defendant's main contention on appeal is that the trial
court violated Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) by failing to inform him,
before he entered his guilty plea, of the maximum additional
sentence that could be imposed upon him by reason of the firearm
enhancement.l
In State v. Gibbons.

740

p.2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987), our

Supreme Court held that strict compliance with the constitutional
and procedural requirements for the taking of a guilty plea was
required before such a plea could be taken. However, pleas taken
before Gibbons2 are upheld so long as the record as a whole
demonstrates "substantial compliance'1 with Rule 11 of the Utah
1. Although defendant raises additional arguments, they are
without merit and we decline to address them further. See, e.g..
State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1989) ("[T]his Court
need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument,
issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal.").
2. Gibbons was a clear break with the Supreme Court's rulings in
previous cases dealing with the validity of guilty pleas and,
therefore, is not applied retroactively, state v Hoff. 814 P.2d
1119, 1123 (Utah 1991).

Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution, w-i llett v.
Barnes. 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992); Sfafp v. Hoff, 814 P.2d
1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991). In this case, defendant's plea was
taken prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gibbons and,
therefore, must be evaluated under the substantial compliance
test.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill, and may noc accept the plea unci! the
court has found:

(5) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences . . . .
During the taking of the plea, the trial court informed defendant
that a one to five year firearm enhancement was possible in
addition to the sentence for the underlying aggravated kidnaping
charge. Defendant then entered his plea of guilty. However, at
defendant's sentencing, following the receipt of a presentence
report indicating five prior convictions for armed robbery, the
court enhanced defendant' s minimum mandatory term of fifteen
years to life with a consecutive term of five to ten years for
his use of a firearm.3 Because the trial court failed to inform
defendant of the maximum sentience that could have been imposed
upon him by reason of the firearm enhancement, the trial court
was not in substantial compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 on
this point.
Nonetheless, it is not necessary that defendant be allowed
to withdraw his guilty plea since the problem is limited to the
3. Of course, at the time the plea was taken, the trial court
did not know of the additional convictions. Nonetheless, the
point could have been adequately covered by explaining the
enhancement scheme to defendant and emphasizing that the
enhancement to be ultimately imposed would depend on the number
and nature of his prior convictions, but could be as much as ten
years. £££ Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1996).

firearm enhancement. At the invitation of the State, we modify
defendant's sentence by reducing the firearm, enhancement to that
which had been explained to him, namely, not less than one year
nor more than five years. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1211
(Utah 1993) (holding that appellate courts have the authority to
modify criminal judgments on appeal). The order appealed from is
otherwise affirmed.

